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Abstract: 
It is increasingly common for noncitizens living in the United States to avoid 
seeing a doctor or enrolling in publicly funded health programs because they fear 
surveillance by immigration authorities. This is the consequence of a decades-long 
shift in the locus of immigration enforcement activities from the border to the 
interior, as well as a recent period of heightened immigration enforcement. These 
fears persist because the law incompletely constrains immigration surveillance in 
health care. 
This Article argues that immigration surveillance in health care is a poor 
choice of resource allocation for immigration enforcement because it has severe 
consequences for health and the health care system; additionally, it compromises 
the legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis its noncitizen residents. The consequences 
include public health threats, health care system inefficiency, ethical dilemmas, 
and increased vulnerability in immigrant communities. Laws permitting 
immigration surveillance in health care also create legitimacy harms by obstructing 
noncitizens’ access to health care and undermining their privacy and rights to 
public benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrates these dangers, but 
they exist even in the absence of a novel disease outbreak. 
Health care access for noncitizens has largely been left to the vagaries of 
immigration policy. Immigration surveillance in health care should prompt us to 
consider the scope and limits of health law and the role of discretion in immigration 
law. Health care sanctuaries — durable legal protections against immigration 
surveillance in health care — recover some of the lost equilibrium between 
immigration enforcement and other goals and values of public policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Low-income immigrants with a serious medical condition are in an impossible 
situation. How much do you risk for medical care? Deportation would 
devastate your family but so would your illness and death.1   
 
A grandfather who visits a hospital emergency room for severe abdominal 
pain refuses to follow up with a gastroenterologist because he is worried that 
enrolling in Medicaid will affect his pending immigration application. A mother 
decides to skip prenatal care for her third pregnancy because she has seen 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers in the parking lot of the 
health clinic. A fast-food worker with COVID-19 symptoms seeks relief from a 
curandero (traditional healer) instead of accessing publicly funded testing and 
treatment because he believes that the information will be tracked and reported to 
immigration authorities. These are examples of how fears of immigration 
surveillance serve as barriers to health care. 
This Article focuses on concerns that arise from two modes of immigration 
surveillance in health care: (1) interrogation, arrest, search, or detention by 
immigration enforcement officers at health care sites; and (2) use of personal 
information disclosed for the purpose of obtaining health care to deny immigration 
benefits or for immigration enforcement purposes. Reluctance to seek health care 
or coverage because of fear of immigration consequences is a barrier to health care 
access for noncitizens.2 Fear discourages noncitizens from seeking care even when 
they are legally entitled to do so.3 It influences the care-seeking behaviors both of 
noncitizens with an array of legal statuses and of their U.S.-citizen family 
members. 
This Article applies the sociological concept of “system avoidance” to 
avoidance of engagement with the health care system because of immigration-
related concerns. System avoidance occurs when “individuals avoid[] institutions 
that keep formal records . . . and therefore heighten the risk of surveillance and 
apprehension by authorities.”4 The migration research literature refers to 
 
 1 LISA SUN-HEE PARK, ENTITLED TO NOTHING: THE STRUGGLE FOR IMMIGRANT HEALTH CARE IN 
THE AGE OF WELFARE REFORM 135 (2011). 
 2 Karen Hacker et al., Barriers to Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants: A Literature 
Review, 8 RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 175, 178 (2015). 
 3 Id. at 180. 
 4 Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional 
Attachment, 79 AM. SOCIO. REV. 367, 368 (2014). Brayne first used the term “system avoidance” to 
describe a behavioral response of individuals who had criminal justice contact and who thereafter 
limited their interactions with recordkeeping institutions such as schools, banks, and hospitals. Id. at 
372. This research indicates that people who have had criminal justice contact avoid recordkeeping 
institutions in order to evade heightened surveillance and, implicitly, further involvement with the 
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avoidance of surveilling institutions by noncitizens with vulnerable legal statuses 
as “chilling effects.”5 As immigration enforcement in homes, workplaces, schools, 
government offices, and the streets has become more commonplace, noncitizens 
have grown increasingly fearful that routine interactions at everyday places can 
lead to arrest and deportation. Health care sites are one such place. Health care 
system avoidance based on fear of immigration surveillance is an example of how 
the expansion of immigration enforcement in the interior of the United States has 
discouraged noncitizens from engaging in socially beneficial behavior. 
The concept of health care system avoidance has spawned a rich literature 
about “legally vulnerable populations” that applies in broad contexts,6 which raises 
 
criminal justice system. Brayne notes that although it has been suggested that system avoidance may 
be observed among other disadvantaged groups, such as undocumented immigrants, studies of the 
phenomenon in noncitizens are few. Id. at 387. Since publication of this landmark article, researchers 
have gathered evidence of system avoidance among noncitizens. See, e.g., Caitlin Patler & Gabriela 
Gonzalez, Compounded Vulnerability: The Consequences of Immigration Detention for Institutional 
Attachment and System Avoidance in Mixed-Immigration-Status Families, SOC. PROBS., Dec. 2020, 
at 14 (noting that members of mixed-status families “express concerns that involvement in formal 
records-keeping institutions will damage the family’s uncertain legal future”). 
 5 Patler & Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 14 (noting the similarity between the concepts of system 
avoidance and chilling effects). Studies examining “chilling effects” or similar phenomena among 
noncitizens span numerous disciplines. Patler and Gonzalez note that in the sociological literature, 
“[i]t is well known that immigrants with vulnerable legal statuses—especially undocumented 
immigrants—are wary of surveilling institutions.” Id. at 2. Asad Asad builds on the sociological 
literature on system avoidance to introduce the concept of “system embeddedness,” observing that 
some undocumented immigrants avoid opportunities to legalize their immigration status because they 
believe that remaining illegible to the immigration system is less risky than engaging with it. Asad 
L. Asad, On the Radar: System Embeddedness and Latin American Immigrants’ Perceived Risk of 
Deportation, 54 L. & SOC’Y REV. 133, 161 (2020). Kathleen Page and Sarah Polk offer the medical 
clinician’s perspective, describing the experience of attempting to care for a pregnant noncitizen 
patient who was diagnosed with syphilis, but who did not pursue treatment because of fear of 
immigration surveillance at the clinic. Kathleen R. Page & Sarah Polk, Chilling Effect? Post-Election 
Health Care Use by Undocumented and Mixed-Status Families, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. e20(1), e20(1) 
(2017). From a health policy perspective, Dhruv Khullar and Dave Chokshi observe that “aggressive 
immigration law enforcement” can cause chilling effects for noncitizens and their family members 
that persist even when a less aggressive enforcement regime is implemented. Dhruv Khullar & Dave 
A. Chokshi, Challenges for Immigrant Health in the USA—The Road to Crisis, 393 LANCET 2168, 
2170 (2019). They also note the uptick in reports of ICE arrests at hospitals since 2017. Id. The link 
between immigration policies and chilling effects on public benefits access have been considered in 
the legal literature as well. See, e.g., David A. Super, The Future of U.S. Immigration Law, 53 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 509, 555-57 (2019). Asad highlights the need for further research on whether 
noncitizens’ involvement with the health care system and public benefits agencies influences their 
perceptions of risk of deportability. Asad, supra, at 161. 
 6 Patler & Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 14. See, e.g., ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE 
IN AN AMERICAN CITY 34 (2014) (describing how policing in certain hospital emergency rooms 
effectively allocates access to health care based on social perceptions of criminality); Brooke A. 
Cunningham, This, Too, Is What Racism Feels Like, 39 HEALTH AFF. 2029 (2020) (describing health 
care system avoidance as a strategy to avoid exposure to racism in the health care system itself); Erin 
M. Kerrison & Alyasah A. Sewell, Negative Illness Feedbacks: High-Frisk Policing Reduces 
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the question: Why examine health care system avoidance as it applies to 
noncitizens? While it is true that awareness of health care system avoidance has 
motivated efforts to expand access to health care and address health care 
disparities, these efforts are inadequate if they do not address the unique and 
disproportionate risks of accessing health care as a noncitizen. Despite this, health 
care access for noncitizens has largely been left to the vagaries of immigration law 
and policy. Furthermore, an examination of system avoidance as a confluence of 
health and immigration policies can help to explain more generally how legally 
imposed categories stratify groups within the U.S. health care system. 
This Article presents a rough framework for balancing health-related policy 
goals with immigration policy goals, each of which are vitally important and often 
contested. It bridges legal scholarship on health care access and immigration 
surveillance — two bodies of literature that have developed independently and that 
have consequential interactions. It contributes to the literature on health care access 
and marginalized communities by synthesizing insights from health law, 
immigration law, and sociology to examine law’s role in generating health care 
system avoidance behaviors. It contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on 
immigration as a social determinant of health by providing a case study of how 
legal status stratification shapes the health of noncitizens and their family 
members.7 
This is also the first Article to comprehensively describe the laws and policies 
pertaining to the government’s conduct of immigration surveillance activities at 
health care sites. Even though some of these laws and policies treat health care 
sites as sanctuaries from immigration enforcement, fear of engaging with the 
health care system is widespread in immigrant communities. The failure of law to 
persuade in this context reflects beliefs among noncitizens and their family 
members that the government will not constrain interior immigration enforcement 
even when there are serious health-related tradeoffs. Correcting this misperception 
and reforming the law to create health care sanctuaries is in the government’s 
immediate and long-term interests. Most urgently, the government will benefit 
from renewed trust during its quest to make the coronavirus into a manageable 
 
Civilian Reliance on ED Services, 55 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 787, 788 (2020) (exploring the 
phenomenon of health care system avoidance in the context of racialized policing practices and police 
violence); Ji Seon Song, Policing the Emergency Room, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2646 (2021) (analyzing 
the law’s role in facilitating racialized policing practices at health care sites). 
 7 See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., IMMIGRATION AS A SOCIAL DETERMINANT 
OF HEALTH: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP (2018); Heide Castañeda et al., Immigration as a Social 
Determinant of Health, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 375 (2015); Wendy E. Parmet, Immigration Law 
as a Social Determinant of Health, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 931 (2020); Meredith Van Natta, Stratified 
Citizenship, Stratified Health: Examining Latinx Legal Status in the U.S. Healthcare Safety Net, 220 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 49 (2019). 
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threat through mass inoculation.8 Transparency and inclusion in the distribution of 
COVID-19 vaccines, including to noncitizens, will protect the lives and 
livelihoods of all people living in the United States. 
This Article argues that immigration surveillance in health care is a poor 
choice of resource allocation for immigration enforcement because it has severe 
collateral consequences for the U.S. health care system and compromises the 
legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis its noncitizen residents. Immigration surveillance 
resources should be concentrated on efforts that produce the greatest benefits and 
the fewest drawbacks. Although immigration surveillance in health care may be 
justified, even sensible in certain narrow circumstances,9 it is a poor tradeoff in the 
general case. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the phenomenon of 
immigration-related health care system avoidance. It presents data showing that 
noncitizens and their family members avoid health clinics, hospitals, and 
enrollment in publicly funded health coverage because of immigration-related 
fears. It draws on sociological theories to demonstrate that these beliefs are 
grounded in legitimate concerns about the expanding web of immigration 
surveillance. 
Part II describes the legal framework of immigration surveillance in health 
care. Although existing laws and policies partially protect noncitizens from 
immigration surveillance in health care, the gradual expansion and normalization 
of interior immigration enforcement motivates system avoidance behaviors among 
noncitizens and their family members. Immigration surveillance involves the mass 
collection and analysis of personal data and the delegation of immigration control 
activities to public and private actors who are not affiliated with immigration 
enforcement agencies.10 It is related to a decades-long shift in the locus of 
 
 8 Advocates, health care providers, and public health experts have long expressed concerns that 
immigration-related fears are a barrier to persuading undocumented noncitizens — many of whom 
live in areas hard-hit by COVID-19 and who are at high risk of exposure due to their work — to get 
the vaccine once it becomes available to them. See, e.g., Catherine E. Shoichet, Fear Could Stop the 
Coronavirus Vaccine from Reaching Some of the People Who Need It Most, CNN (Dec. 22, 2020, 
11:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/22/health/undocumented-immigrants-coronavirus-
vaccine/index.html. 
 9 Justifications for criminal policing in health care settings may include providing security for 
health care personnel; responding to calls from hospitals based on certain types of injuries, for 
example, non-self-inflicted gunshot wounds; collecting evidence such as patient belongings and 
statements where crime is suspected; and remaining with an injured patient if they are already under 
arrest. See Song, supra note 6, at 13-15. These justifications are far less convincing as applied to 
immigration policing when no crime is suspected. However, disentangling policing in the criminal 
justice system from immigration enforcement has become more complicated as ties between the two 
systems have deepened. See Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1773 
(2015). 
 10 See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 27 (2014). 
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immigration enforcement activities from the border to the interior.11 
Delegating immigration surveillance to public and private actors who are not 
affiliated with immigration enforcement agencies is an increasingly important part 
of immigration enforcement.12 It casts a wider net for identifying noncitizens of 
interest to immigration enforcement agencies; at the same time, it discourages 
noncitizens from engaging in socially valuable behaviors, such as seeking COVID-
19 testing from a publicly funded health clinic or enrolling in Medicaid in order to 
afford the costs of treatment.13 Immigration enforcement officers routinely surveil 
noncitizens while they go about the ordinary tasks of life in their homes, places of 
employment, schools, courthouses, and hospitals. As a result, noncitizens perceive 
the prospect of interrogation or arrest by immigration enforcement officers at or 
near health care sites as a realistic risk.14 Likewise, they avoid participating in 
publicly funded health programs if there is a possibility that the information they 
disclose will be shared with immigration agencies. 
Laws and policies limiting immigration enforcement activity at health care 
provider sites and generally protecting the confidentiality of personal information 
submitted to public benefit agencies have not allayed noncitizens’ fears of 
accessing health care or publicly funded health coverage.15 This is, in part, due to 
gaps, uncertainties, and exceptions in the law. Noncitizens’ skepticism about the 
law’s protections may also be considered a rational response to the overt and covert 
expansion of immigration surveillance over time. For example, a regulation 
promulgated in 2019,16 and since rescinded,17 increased the risk that certain 
noncitizens who enrolled in Medicaid would be denied lawful permanent resident 
 
 11 See, e.g., Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 
1463, 1466 (2019) (arguing that “immigration enforcement should not be conceptualized as 
synonymous with deportation; rather, deportation is merely the tip of a much larger enforcement 
pyramid”). 
 12 Id. at 1466-67 (describing interior immigration enforcement as “a low-cost way to achieve 
enforcement objectives”); see also Dennis Broeders & Godfried Engbersen, The Fight Against Illegal 
Migration: Identification Policies and Immigrants’ Counterstrategies, 50 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
1592, 1593 (2007) (describing this phenomenon in the European context). 
 13 Broeders & Engbersen, supra note 12, at 1595. 
 14 By “health care sites,” I mean the full spectrum of places where people go to access health 
care, including hospitals, outpatient clinics (whether they are private, public, volunteer-run, mobile, 
school-based, or inside retail stores), urgent care centers, state and local health departments, 
community-based organizations offering health services, pharmacies, and health fairs. 
 15 See, e.g., July Lee et al., Opportunities for Supporting Latino Immigrants in Emergency and 
Ambulatory Care Settings, 46 J. CMTY. HEALTH 494, 498 (2020) (describing noncitizen parents’ “fear 
that health care settings will send their personal information to the government, allowing ICE to find 
their addresses and look for them in their homes”). 
 16 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,295 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to 
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 245, 248). 
 17 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds; Implementation of Vacatur, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,221 
(Mar. 15, 2021) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 106, 212, 213, 214, 245, 248). 
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(LPR) status. As part of the immigration application process, noncitizens were 
required to provide details about their use of Medicaid and other public benefits.18 
They were also compelled to authorize U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
to verify this information with other government agencies, including the 
Department of Health and Human Services.19 This policy and others have 
exacerbated noncitizens’ fears of accessing publicly funded health care because of 
the perception that any use of public benefits will increase the risk that a future 
immigration application will be denied. 
Part III draws out the ways in which permitting surveillance in health care (or 
affirming conceptions that it occurs) creates tradeoffs between immigration and 
health policy. Laws that permit immigration surveillance in health care, and 
therefore generate fears of accessing health care among noncitizens and their 
family members, have serious collateral consequences for the health care system 
that should be considered in weighing their utility. First, when people delay or 
avoid seeking vaccines or treatment for infectious disease like COVID-19, they 
increase their risk of transmitting the infection to others, thereby contributing to 
disease burden. Second, it is harder for providers to generate good outcomes and 
practice cost-effective care when patients delay or avoid routine care — the risk of 
becoming seriously ill or dying from all kinds of medical conditions increases.20 
Third, permitting immigration surveillance in health care creates ethical dilemmas 
for health care providers. When health care providers become or are perceived as 
being complicit with immigration enforcement, it may contradict their professional 
duties to patients. Providers cannot act with single-minded devotion to the well-
being of patients when patients’ engagement with the health care system may have 
negative immigration consequences. As a result, providers are sometimes forced 
to alter clinical risk calculations and clinical recommendations for reasons relating 
to immigration enforcement.21 Fourth, policies that increase the risks of people 
dying or suffering from treatable and preventable conditions may violate health 
equity norms, including commitments to reduce racial health disparities. 
The state also compromises its legitimacy in several ways by permitting 
immigration surveillance in health care. This is the subject of Part IV. First, the 
laws regulating immigration surveillance in health care impose nearly 
insurmountable barriers for noncitizens to understand how and when they may 
 
 18 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,419. 
 19 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-944, 
DECLARATION OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY (2019). 
 20 See, e.g., Mark É. Czeisler et al., Delay or Avoidance of Medical Care Because of COVID-
19-Related Concerns – United States, June 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1250 
(2020) (describing how delay or avoidance of medical care during the COVID-19 pandemic 
increased morbidity and mortality risk from treatable and preventable conditions). 
 21 Meredith Van Natta, First Do No Harm: Medical Legal Violence and Immigrant Health in 
Coral County, USA, SOC. SCI. & MED., Aug. 2019, at 1. 
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access health care without triggering immigration-related consequences. This is a 
severe and burdensome constraint on noncitizens. Second, they encourage or 
require noncitizens to relinquish their privacy rights in their public benefits 
records. Third, they undermine noncitizens’ property rights in public benefits by 
threatening a deprivation of liberty based on exercise of those rights. 
Part V explains how creating durable legal protections against immigration 
surveillance in health care — “health care sanctuaries” — and making them well 
known can allay fears of accessing health care in immigrant communities. Such 
legal changes will recover some of the lost equilibrium between immigration 
enforcement and other goals and values of public policy.22 If legal health care 
sanctuaries are a political impossibility, health care institutions can still take steps 
to limit information sharing with immigration agencies, provide physical refuge 
from immigration enforcement, link noncitizens with legal services, and promote 
norms of justice and empathy in immigration policy. Institution-level policy 
changes designed to protect noncitizen access to health care may catalyze legal 
reform. 
I. NONCITIZENS AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AVOIDANCE 
This Part introduces the phenomenon of immigration-related health care 
system avoidance by describing who is affected and summarizing the sociological 
literature explaining how and why it occurs. While noncitizens face barriers to 
accessing health care that are common to many other socioeconomically 
marginalized groups,23 immigration-related health care system avoidance is driven 
by fears of immigration surveillance while accessing health care.24 When they 
perceive this risk, noncitizens and their family members avoid engaging with the 
 
 22 Amanda Frost, Can the Government Deport Immigrants Using Information it Encouraged 
Them to Provide?, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 97, 98 (2017) (stating that “[t]he federal government 
has always balanced immigration enforcement against other goals and values” in the context of 
analyzing whether the Trump Administration should use information submitted by Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) applicants to deport them). 
 23 See, e.g., Timothy Callaghan et al., Immigrant Health Access in Texas: Policy, Rhetoric, and 
Fear in the Trump Era, 19 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 342, 343 (2019) (summarizing prior research 
indicating that access barriers for Hispanic immigrants include “lack of insurance . . . the cost of care, 
transportation, the inability to take time away from work, child care, limited knowledge, language, 
gender, ethnicity, documentation status, and fear”); Scott D. Rhodes et al., The Impact of Local 
Immigration Enforcement Policies on the Health of Immigrant Hispanics/Latinos in the United 
States, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 329, 329 (2015) (noting barriers of “a lack of bilingual and bicultural 
services, low health literacy, insufficient public transportation, and limited knowledge of available 
health services”). 
 24 See Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 329 (highlighting “fear of deportation, a lack of required 
forms of documentation, interaction with law enforcement personnel, and racial profiling” as 
“factors . . . associated with reduced utilization of health services and worse health” among 
noncitizens identifying as Hispanic or Latino). 
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health care system. In practice, this involves delaying or canceling doctors’ visits 
and declining to participate in health care programs in order to guard against 
negative immigration consequences. 
A broad range of noncitizens as well as U.S. citizens may engage in health 
care system avoidance.25 Undocumented noncitizens are the most obvious targets 
of immigration surveillance because they are not legally authorized to be in the 
country. This group comprises not only people who enter the country without 
inspection at the border, but also those who entered with legal status but who have 
violated the terms of their status. Typical ways of violating the terms of one’s status 
are to stay in the country beyond the date of one’s authorized period of stay or to 
perform work that is not authorized by one’s status.26 For example, a noncitizen 
may enter the country with a tourist visa that authorizes them to stay in the United 
States for three months. If that noncitizen stays in the country beyond three months, 
they are considered undocumented. 
It is common for noncitizens to move across the documentation status 
continuum throughout their lives, with periods of authorized and unauthorized 
status.27 Because of the backlog in processing for most immigration applications, 
applicants can wait months or years to receive a decision on an immigration 
application, all the while living in a kind of “twilight” status.28 Long-term 
residence in the United States is a characteristic of most undocumented 
noncitizens’ lives.29 Despite this fact, undocumented noncitizens live with the 
knowledge that even routine interactions — such as going to the doctor — can 
result in arrest, detention, and deportation.30 
Foreign-born people with legal status are not immune to the negative 
consequences of immigration surveillance. An environment of heightened 
immigration enforcement can affect health care-related behaviors of noncitizens 
 
 25 As will be explained, U.S. citizens may fear that their interactions with health care institutions 
could put their noncitizen family members at risk of negative immigration consequences, such as 
denial of a pending or future immigration application or deportation. See infra text accompanying 
notes 36-38, 40-41. Jennifer Chacón proposes using the concept of “liminal legality” to describe the 
condition of a broad range of people whose lives are impacted by heightened monitoring of 
noncitizens by government agencies (among other trends in immigration policy). Jennifer M. 
Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 709, 712, 730 (2015). 
 26 Broeders & Engbersen, supra note 12, at 1594 (“Most typologies of irregular migration 
are . . . set up around three main criteria. There is legal and illegal entry, legal and illegal residence, 
and legal or illegal employment.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Jain, supra note 11, at 1473 (explaining that the distinction between “legal” and 
“illegal” noncitizens is not always clear because some who currently lack a valid status may acquire 
one in the future and some with a valid status may lose it). 
 28 DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER EXAMINATION 
OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION 1 (2005). 
 29 Jain, supra note 11, at 1464-65 (noting “the median length of residence being about fourteen 
years”). 
 30 Id. at 1473-74. 
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who are not the “intended target[s]” of immigration enforcement.31 One reason for 
this is that it can be confusing — both for noncitizens and for those to whom 
immigration surveillance duties have been delegated — to determine whether a 
particular status or quasi-status subjects a person to immigration enforcement.32 
Naturalized U.S. citizens may feel that their status is insecure, especially in light 
of the significant escalation of denaturalization proceedings from 2017 to 2020.33 
Even natural-born U.S. citizens, particularly those who are related to noncitizens 
or who are simply nonwhite, have reason to feel that their status is precarious.34 In 
recent years, the media has reported on several cases of natural-born U.S. citizens 
who were deported to other countries or denied the rights of citizenship, such as 
obtaining a U.S. passport.35 
Finally, members of “mixed-status” households — which may include U.S. 
citizens and noncitizens with various statuses or no status — may alter their care-
seeking behaviors in response to immigration surveillance in order to avoid 
scrutiny of the noncitizen family members.36 Heide Castañeda’s research has 
highlighted the analytical significance of mixed-status families in studying access 
to health care, noting that each family member may have a different relationship 
to the state and therefore different rights and opportunities with respect to health 
care access.37 If there was any chance that enrollment would affect a family 
 
 31 Lisa J. Hardy et al, A Call for Further Research on the Impact of State-Level Immigration 
Policies on Public Health, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1250, 1250 (2012) (describing the effects of S.B. 
1070 on noncitizens with legal status in Arizona); see also Van Natta, supra note 21, at 3 (describing 
how a person in asylum proceedings feared “becoming legible to federal bureaucracies” by applying 
for publicly funded health insurance). 
 32 Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 782 (2008) 
(noting “[t]here is no one definitive document that establishes legal presence. . . . [T]o private parties 
who have no immigration law training, making that determination can be fraught with error.”). 
 33 Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Inalienable Citizenship, N.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 4-5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3691695& (describing the politically driven increase, since 2017, in the number of denaturalization 
cases referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution). 
 34 Chacón describes how, over the last two decades, a shift in immigration policy has enhanced 
the sense of legal precarity among lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens. Chacón, supra note 
25, at 731, 734. She also describes how “many individuals experience overlapping forms of liminality 
because of their race, their geographic location and their immigration status.” Id. at 731. 
 35 Manta & Robertson, supra note 33, at 3 (describing the cases of five natural-born U.S. 
citizens who were denied rights of U.S. citizenship, including a Black teenager who was deported to 
Colombia even though she had no ties or familial connection to the country). 
 36 Patler & Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 4 (reporting “reductions in qualified Medicaid 
enrollment, healthcare-seeking, and accessing service-providing institutions among U.S. citizens 
who may share households with noncitizens”). 
 37 Heide Castañeda, Stratification by Immigration Status: Contradictory Exclusion and 
Inclusion After Health Care Reform, in UNEQUAL COVERAGE: THE EXPERIENCE OF HEALTH CARE 
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 37, 44-45 (Jessica M. Mulligan & Heide Castañeda eds., 2018) 
(noting that the complexity of immigration status-related eligibility rules governing subsidized health 
coverage is a barrier to enrollment for mixed-status families). 
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member’s ability to remain in the United States or become a U.S. citizen, families 
would err on the side of caution, declining to enroll in or even withdrawing from 
programs.38 Even members of mixed-status families who knew they were eligible 
for subsidized health coverage declined to enroll to avoid “being on the list” or 
owing any “debts” to the government, lest such actions impact their or their family 
members’ ability to obtain immigration benefits.39 Parents in mixed-status families 
face especially difficult choices between accessing public benefits that will support 
their children’s health and development and risking either long-term family 
separation or having to raise their children — often U.S. citizens — in an 
unfamiliar country with fewer opportunities and, sometimes, dangerous 
conditions.40 
This indicates that the chilling effects of immigration surveillance in health 
care extend to U.S. citizen family members of noncitizens.41 For these reasons, 
references to noncitizen behavior in this Article may apply to their U.S. citizen 
household members. When family members decline to enroll in public benefits for 
which they are eligible, all family members suffer from the foregone support.42 
Fear of deportation and other immigration consequences is a well-
documented, longstanding, and widespread barrier to health care for noncitizens.43 
 
 38 Id. at 45; Patler & Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 9-10 (observing that spouses of noncitizens in 
immigration detention or who had been deported “avoided accessing much-needed public benefits” 
based on a fear of negatively impacting their spouses’ immigration case or future case). Applications 
for publicly funded health insurance typically require applicants to submit personal information about 
all members of the household, even if they are not applying for benefits. 
 39 Castañeda, supra note 37, at 44. 
 40 Super, supra note 5, at 559; see also Castañeda, supra note 37, at 47 (noting that such 
decisions were made “with an eye toward the greater good of the family”); Lee et al., supra note 15, 
at 6 (“Since the most recent public charge ruling was proposed, many [Latino immigrant] parents 
have disenrolled themselves from medical insurance but the overwhelming majority continue to keep 
their children enrolled.”); Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 334 (finding that parents’ fear of being 
identified as undocumented led them to delay necessary diagnoses, care, and treatment for their 
children). 
 41 Patler & Gonzalez, supra note 4, at 14. See generally Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 336 
(finding that immigration-related health care system avoidance led some study participants to 
“sacrific[e] their own health and the health of members of their families”); Catherine J. Taylor, 
Health Consequences of Laws and Public Policies That Target, or Protect, Marginalized 
Populations, 14 SOCIO. COMPASS 1, 6 (2020) (describing how health-related consequences of laws 
and policies targeting undocumented noncitizens can spill over to lawfully present noncitizens and 
co-ethnic U.S. citizens who live in the same communities). 
 42 Super, supra note 5, at 548-49, 559. 
 43 See, e.g., LEIGHTON KU & MARIELLEN JEWERS, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., HEALTH CARE FOR 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES: CURRENT POLICIES AND ISSUES 11 (2013); PARK, supra note 1, at 46-47 
(describing “possible negative ramifications for the individual and his or her family’s immigration 
status” as one among several barriers to health care for noncitizens); Asad, supra note 5, at 150 
(describing one noncitizen’s deportation fears of returning to the hospital, where he also owes 
$20,000 for an emergency gallstone surgery); Callaghan et al., supra note 23, at 346 (“[F]ear remains 
a pervasive and problematic barrier for undocumented immigrants and their families attempting to 
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Numerous studies show that fear of immigration consequences can motivate 
noncitizens’ decisions to delay seeking health care.44 Family members of people 
having medical emergencies hesitate to dial 911 over concern about whether an 
unpaid ambulance bill will invite scrutiny under the public charge law.45 Burn 
victims arrive at the hospital too late to survive infection.46 Women in labor show 
up at emergency rooms without having had any prenatal care;47 some who suffer 
from untreated gestational diabetes during their pregnancies must have limbs 
amputated afterward.48 Fears of immigration-related consequences are so intense 
that some noncitizens decline care altogether,49 even in life-threatening 
situations.50 
 
access care.”); Shari B. Fallek, Health Care for Illegal Aliens: Why It Is a Necessity, 19 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 951, 973 (1997) (describing how “thousands of fearful immigrants have refrained from 
seeking medical aid and attending their appointments at California clinics” after the passage of 
Proposition 187, even though enforcement was enjoined); Hacker et al., supra note 2, at 178 (finding 
that 65% of articles in a medical literature review of barriers to health care for noncitizens without 
legal status identified fear of deportation as a barrier and noting that the phenomenon was observed 
in France and Denmark, as well as in the United States); Karen Hacker et al., Providers’ Perspectives 
on the Impact of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Activity on Immigrant Health, 23 J. 
HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED 651, 660-61 (2012); Lee et al., supra note 15, at 4-6 
(describing immigrant parents’ “fear of being discovered and deported by [ICE] en route to the health 
care setting or once already there,” which leads them to delay seeking care); id. at 1-2 (describing 
Latino immigrants’ fears of seeking testing or care for COVID-19); Sana Loue, Immigrants, 
Immigration Law, and Tuberculosis, 71 WASH. L. REV. 969, 985 (1996) (describing fear among 
undocumented immigrants that health care providers would report them to immigration); Helen B. 
Marrow & Tiffany D. Joseph, Excluded and Frozen Out: Unauthorised Immigrants’ (Non)Access to 
Care After U.S. Health Care Reform, 41 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 2253, 2265 (2015) 
(describing patients’ fear of using health care services due to possible surveillance by immigration 
and local law enforcement in Massachusetts and San Francisco); K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation 
Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1486 (2019); Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 329, 336 (finding that 
noncitizen study participants feared deportation and therefore avoided health services). 
 44 See, e.g., NOLAN KLINE, PATHOGENIC POLICING: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND HEALTH 
IN THE U.S. SOUTH 151 (2019) (noting that the threat of immigration surveillance at health care sites 
in the Atlanta area “ultimately resulted in Grady [Memorial Hospital] becoming a place that some 
immigrants felt was safe only in case of an emergency”); Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 332, 336 
(finding that noncitizen study participants reported delaying preventive care, including prenatal care, 
and enduring illness rather than seeking diagnostic care); PARK, supra note 1, at 47. 
 45 PARK, supra note 1, at 46, 92 (describing cases involving choking and a heart attack). 
 46 Id. at 92 
 47 See id. at 93; Caitlin Dickerson, Undocumented and Pregnant: Why Women Are Afraid to 
Get Prenatal Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/
undocumented-immigrants-pregnant-prenatal.html. 
 48 PARK, supra note 1, at 93. 
 49 Callaghan et al., supra note 23, at 346 (noting that undocumented immigrants and their family 
members in Texas routinely forego necessary health care); Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 332 
(finding that noncitizens “did not access or utilize health services for which they were eligible, 
including preventive services” such as reproductive health services based on fears of immigration 
surveillance). 
 50 See, e.g., PARK, supra note 1, at 93 (describing how a patient diagnosed with uterine cancer 
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Having health insurance is critical for obtaining timely and adequate health 
care, and decades of research demonstrate that noncitizens and their family 
members will hesitate to enroll in publicly funded health insurance if there is a risk 
of negative immigration consequences.51 Even a request for immigration 
documents, Social Security numbers (SSNs), or valid driver’s licenses from a 
public benefit agency may be sufficient to provoke concerns about immigration 
surveillance and deter noncitizens from seeking coverage.52 Immigration-related 
concerns are partially responsible for the twenty percent decline in Medicaid 
enrollment among noncitizen families with children between 1994 and 1997, when 
punitive immigration and welfare laws were enacted.53 Similarly, during the 
Trump Administration, which vowed to increase immigration enforcement from 
day one and promulgated new public charge regulations that would penalize 
certain noncitizens for enrolling in Medicaid, enrollment among Latinx immigrant 
families decreased.54 
Sometimes, immigration-related health care system avoidance is based on 
 
declined to proceed with the recommended treatment, a hysterectomy, because she was afraid that 
she or her family would be deported); Kathleen R. Page & Alejandra Flores-Miller, Lessons We’ve 
Learned — Covid-19 and the Undocumented Latinx Community, 384 NEW ENG. J. MED 5, 5-6 
(describing noncitizen fears of seeking testing and treatment for COVID-19, despite their higher risk 
of exposure to the virus). 
 51 See, e.g., Marcella Alsan & Crystal S. Yang, Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure 
Communities 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24731, 2019) (finding decreased 
safety net participation by noncitizens and their family members based on deportation fear); Hacker 
et al., supra note 43, at 660 (“Patients feared that providing any documentation for insurance 
enrollment purposes would risk exposure.”); Kimberly A. Johns & Christos Varkoutas, The 
Tuberculosis Crisis: The Deadly Consequence of Immigration Policies and Welfare Reform, 15 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 101, 121 (1998); KU & JEWERS, supra note 43, at 11 (“Unauthorized 
immigrants often worry that seeking care, particularly at a public facility, may lead to exposure of 
their unauthorized status and increase the risk of sanctions such as deportation. Even legal immigrants 
may worry that using benefits could jeopardize their legal status and perhaps make it harder to gain 
citizenship or permanent residency.”); Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented 
Immigrants’ Access to Health Services: The Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH, 1630, 1632 (2003). 
 52 See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 44, at 59 (describing the impact of a Georgia law excluding 
passports as an acceptable form of identification when applying for public benefits); Castañeda, 
supra note 37, at 46 (describing the impact of new identification requirements in the ACA on 
members of mixed-status families who are eligible for publicly funded health insurance); Lee et al., 
supra note 15, at 5; Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 332, 334. 
 53 Super, supra note 5, at 556. 
 54 Lee et al., supra note 15, at 6. 
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incorrect information,55 but the fear is often warranted.56 Researchers have 
gathered evidence of health care providers threatening to call immigration 
authorities for the purpose of discouraging noncitizens from seeking care.57 In one 
case that received national media attention, staff at the medical clinic where Blanca 
Borrego arrived for a routine gynecological appointment called law enforcement 
when they suspected that she had provided a fake driver’s license as identification, 
leading to her arrest in an exam room and putting her at risk of deportation.58 
Such egregious behavior has the effect of reducing the number of places where 
noncitizens feel safe obtaining health care.59 Just as studies of system avoidance 
have revealed that people who have had criminal justice contact will continue to 
engage with institutions perceived as “non-surveilling,”60 many noncitizens feel 
that they are limited to underfunded, alternative, or nonmedical sources of care.61 
This indicates that it is the surveillance that discourages engagement, not “an 
 
 55 See, e.g., Callaghan et al., supra note 23, at 346 (reporting a community health worker’s 
observation that noncitizens may have erroneously connected decisions to seek health care with 
subsequent immigration decisions, “creating a cycle of misinformation”); Philip Kretsedemas, 
Avoiding the State: Haitian Immigrants and Welfare Services in Miami-Dade County, in 
IMMIGRANTS, WELFARE REFORM, AND THE POVERTY OF POLICY 107, 115 (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana 
Aparicio eds., 2004) (finding that nearly half of immigrants surveyed believed, erroneously, that 
obtaining services from a community health center would implicate public charge inadmissibility); 
Lee et al., supra note 15, at 6 (noting that some noncitizens declined to renew Medicaid coverage 
based on “mixed messages regarding the impact of public charge”). 
 56 Ella Wesson, Interviewing William Lopez: The Health Impacts of United States Immigration 
Policy in the Context of the Trump Administration and COVID-19, HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. (Nov. 
10, 2020), http://www.hhpronline.org/articles/2020/11/ 
8/interviewing-william-lopez-the-health-impacts-of-united-states-immigration-policy-in-the-
context-of-the-trump-administration-and-covid-19 (noting that undocumented noncitizens worry 
that accessing health care can lead to deportation because of a general fear of the government’s ability 
to surveil). 
 57 See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 44, at 149. 
 58 See, e.g., Dan Solomon, Undocumented Harris County Woman Faced Deportation After 
Being Arrested at Her OB-GYN, TEX. MONTHLY (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.texasmonthly.com/
the-daily-post/an-undocumented-harris-county-woman-faced-deportation-after-being-arrested-at-
her-ob-gyn/. It is unclear whether Ms. Borrego was ultimately deported. 
 59 KLINE, supra note 44, at 151; Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 334 (finding that noncitizen 
study participants were “reoccupied [sic] with avoiding interactions with systems, suspicious of those 
in positions of power (including health care providers), and fearful of being detained and deported”); 
Harris Meyer, Tougher Immigration Enforcement is Taking a Toll on Healthcare, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170421/
NEWS/170429967/tougher-immigration-enforcement-is-taking-a-toll-on-healthcare (quoting the 
chief medical officer of a community health center in Philadelphia who described the need to dispel 
rumors that the organization had shared information about patients with ICE agents). 
 60 Brayne, supra note 4, at 385. 
 61 See Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 334 (reporting that noncitizen study participants “often 
rely on . . . self-diagnosing and self-treating and using medications purchased from Latino stores, 
brought from their home country, or left over from others’ prescriptions”). 
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aversion to institutions in general.”62 
Anecdotal evidence of immigration enforcement at health care sites abounds. 
Border Patrol agents monitor the corridors of hospital emergency departments, 
enter exam rooms, and discuss medical care with physicians.63 Immigration 
enforcement agents and their local police delegates conduct surveillance from the 
parking lots of health care sites and detain noncitizen patients as they leave 
appointments.64 One health care provider at a prenatal clinic in San Diego noted 
an increase in the number of patient “no-shows” on days when Border Patrol vans 
were parked in its lot.65 
Undocumented noncitizens have been arrested while traveling to or from the 
hospital to obtain treatment for themselves or their ill family members, even in 
emergency situations.66 Upon discharge, they may be transferred directly to 
detention facilities rather than being permitted to recuperate at home.67 Near U.S. 
 
 62 Brayne, supra note 4, at 385. 
 63 See Jaime La Charite et al., Healthcare Professionals’ Experience, Training, and Knowledge 
Regarding Immigration-Related Law Enforcement in Healthcare Facilities: An Online Survey, 49 
J.L., MED. & ETHICS 50, 52 (2021) (“Nearly 1 in 5 [providers surveyed] reported that they were aware 
of immigration enforcement activities in or near their workplace . . . .”); Adriana Gomez Licon, 
Border Patrol’s Growing Presence at Hospitals Creates Fear, AP (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/article/52a38ce1d4b84e289b807 
3b47674514e (“The presence of immigration authorities is becoming increasingly common at health 
care facilities around the country, and hospitals are struggling with where to draw the line to protect 
patients’ rights . . . .”). 
 64 See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 44, at 150-51 (describing observations of a Grady Memorial 
Hospital staff member about immigration policing); Altaf Saadi & Martin McKee, Hospitals as 
Places of Sanctuary, BMJ, May 17, 2018, at 1 (noting the occurrence of immigration enforcement at 
or near health facilities). 
 65 PARK, supra note 1, at 122-23. 
 66 See, e.g., Camilo Montoya-Galvez, 15-year-old Girl Who Spent Her Life in the U.S. Facing 
Deportation After Hospital Arrest, CBS NEWS (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/15-
year-old-girl-who-spent-her-life-in-the-u-s-facing-deportation-after-hospital-arrest/ (describing how 
an undocumented teenager and her aunt were arrested by CBP after the child was required to travel 
through an internal Border Patrol checkpoint in Texas to obtain emergency gallbladder surgery); 
Claudia Flores et al., DHS Must Suspend Certain Immigration Enforcement Practices During the 
Coronavirus Outbreak, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 10, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/03/10/481471/dhs-must-suspend-
certain-immigration-enforcement-practices-coronavirus-outbreak/ (describing the arrest of “35-year-
old Joel Arrona-Lara at a gas station as he was driving his pregnant wife to the hospital for a 
scheduled cesarean section”); Licon, supra note 63; Barbara Campbell, Girl Detained by Border 
Patrol After Emergency Surgery Released to Parents, NPR (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org
/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/03/562003841/girl-detained-by-border-patrol-after-emergency-
surgery-is-released-to-parents (describing how ten-year-old Rosa Maria Hernandez was detained 
after attempting to pass through an internal Border Patrol checkpoint in Texas in order to obtain 
emergency gallbladder surgery). 
 67 Campbell, supra note 66 (describing how Hernandez, who has cerebral palsy, was detained 
at a facility for children after receiving lifesaving surgery before eventually being released to her 
parents). 
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borders, immigration checkpoints prevent or complicate access to health care for 
family members of undocumented noncitizens, including U.S. citizen children 
with disabilities and premature babies.68 
Since 9/11, federal agencies have increasingly cooperated to share 
information for the purpose of detecting and preventing all matter of threats.69 
These datasets, accessible to immigration enforcement agencies, include public 
health data gathered from public hospitals. It is not unreasonable to worry that the 
collection and analysis of such data could affect future immigration options.70 
When the cost of medical treatment is, potentially, deportation or denial of 
immigration benefits, health care system avoidance among noncitizens should be 
expected. 
II. IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE IN HEALTH CARE 
This Part describes the legal framework of immigration surveillance in health 
care. In this Article, I use the term “immigration surveillance in health care” to 
refer to specific modes of immigration surveillance at specific types of sites. The 
first of two modes of immigration surveillance on which I focus is interrogation, 
arrest, search, or detention by immigration enforcement officers at health care 
sites. The second is use of personal information disclosed for the purpose of 
obtaining health care to deny immigration benefits or for immigration enforcement 
purposes. This Part begins with an overview of the policy context of immigration 
surveillance in health care. It then describes the laws and policies governing 
physical and informational surveillance of noncitizens by immigration agencies at 
 
 68 Tom Jawetz & Ed Chung, Federal Immigration Officials Can Help Protect Public Health 
During the Coronavirus Pandemic, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 18, 2020, 9:03 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/03/18/481865/ 
federal-immigration-officials-can-help-protect-public-health-coronavirus-pandemic/; Elena Mejia 
Lutz, At Border Patrol Checkpoints, an Impossible Choice Between Health Care and Deportation, 
TEX. OBSERVER (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.texasobserver.org/border-patrol-checkpoints-
impossible-choice-health-care-deportation/ (describing a child with scoliosis whose necessary 
surgery was delayed for eleven years and a physician’s recollection of “cases in which premature 
babies born to undocumented parents near the border must travel alone by helicopter or ambulance” 
to the hospital, despite a longstanding CBP policy requiring “expedited transit” for families in such 
circumstances); Campbell, supra note 66. 
 69 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1450-51 (2011). This type of information-sharing 
likely preceded 9/11 on a smaller scale. As David Super notes, “[i]n some southwestern towns, public 
benefits eligibility workers are married to border patrol officers and have reported suspected 
undocumented immigrants over the breakfast table.” Super, supra note 5, at 561-62. 
 70 See Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
1139, 1147 (2018) (“Risk profiles [generated by the government] can be shared with a host of federal 
and state agencies, impacting poor mothers’ opportunities, from government employment to 
immigration.”). 
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health care sites. Although some legal protections against immigration surveillance 
in health care exist, gaps and uncertainties in the law explain why health care 
system avoidance persists among noncitizens and their family members. 
A. Policy Context 
In general, as a prerequisite for seeking out health care or health coverage, 
people must have some sense that they will be safe in doing so.71 Law sometimes 
provides assurances to patients that their pursuit of health care will not result in 
negative consequences — for example, law that broadly protects the 
confidentiality of information that patients share with their health care providers.72 
In general, and with limited exceptions, patients should feel comfortable coming 
to health care sites without fear of arrest or interrogation and sharing personal 
information with their providers without fear of disclosure to law enforcement. 
However, as Part I illustrates, law does not always ensure conditions that will 
overcome potential patients’ fears of the negative consequences of seeking out 
health care. 
Immigration surveillance in health care is one form of interior immigration 
enforcement.73 Like other forms, it “draws the migration border inward,” occurring 
 
 71 There are many examples of this. Pregnant women with opioid use disorder will not seek out 
prenatal care if they face a risk of criminal prosecution related to their drug use. Lynn Falletta et al., 
Perceptions of Child Protective Services Among Pregnant or Recently Pregnant, Opioid-Using 
Women in Substance Abuse Treatment, 79 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 125, 126 (2018) (reporting that 
“several studies have found feared loss of custody to CPS as a potential barrier to prenatal care among 
women with substance use disorders”). Travelers suspected of having an infectious disease like 
COVID-19, Ebola, or multi-drug resistant tuberculosis will not submit to public health authorities 
for treatment unless they are assured of the limits and conditions of quarantine. See Valerie A. 
Earnshaw et al., Medical Mistrust in the Context of Ebola: Implications for Intended Care-Seeking 
and Quarantine Policy Support in the United States, 24 J. HEALTH PSYCH. 219, 225 (2016) 
(“[I]ndividuals who endorse medical conspiracy beliefs may oppose quarantine policies due to the 
control over individual autonomy that such policies grant authorities . . . .”). People with psychiatric 
disorders will not request an adjustment to their medication if doing so would put them in danger of 
involuntary commitment. See Marvin S. Swartz, Jeffrey W. Swanson & Michael J. Hannon, Does 
Fear of Coercion Keep People Away from Mental Health Treatment? Evidence from a Survey of 
Persons with Schizophrenia and Mental Health Professionals, 21 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 459, 467 (2003) 
(reporting that “fear of involuntary hospitalization was the most frequently cited barrier to treatment” 
among subjects with schizophrenia). Patients who have experienced health care-induced trauma as 
children may avoid all preventive care as adults. See Chrystal L. Lewis et al., Once BITTEN, Twice 
Shy: An Applied Trauma-Informed Healthcare Model, 32 NURSING SCI. Q. 291, 293-94 (2019) 
(discussing the phenomenon of “medical trauma” and noting that “a patient with a history of trauma 
who is actively experiencing a PTS reaction might find it difficult to form a trusting relationship with 
his or her HCP during the medical encounter”). 
 72 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1938 (1996); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2021). 
 73 See Jain, supra note 11, at 1490 (describing how interior immigration enforcement may occur 
in various settings). 
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at sites of routine interaction that exist to support the health and wellbeing of 
members of society.74 Laws and policies that increase immigration surveillance in 
the country’s interior are designed not only to apprehend and eventually remove 
deportable noncitizens, but also to deter all kinds of noncitizens from settling in or 
even coming to the United States by imposing harsh living conditions.75 This 
theory of deterrence has come to be known as “self-deportation,” and it operates 
by making ordinary — and even socially desirable — behaviors risky.76 For a 
variety of reasons, heightened interior immigration enforcement is unlikely to 
persuade long-term undocumented noncitizens to leave.77 It does, however, 
constrain their choices in everyday matters (such as whether to seek health care) 
that can have significant consequences.78 
Uncertainty about the law complicates noncitizens’ ability to calculate the 
risks of engaging in ordinary activities. One source of uncertainty among 
noncitizens is the discretion that is a hallmark of the U.S. immigration system.79 
Because immigration agencies have broad authority to decide, among other things, 
how to conduct immigration surveillance,80 there is significant uncertainty among 
noncitizens about how the law will apply to them.81 A second source of uncertainty 
 
 74 Kalhan, supra note 10, at 60-61; see also PARK, supra note 1, at 116 (“Welfare and health 
policies . . . inconspicuously extend the power of the border far beyond the literal, physical fence.”). 
Put another way, “[t]he Border is everywhere.” Robert S. Chang, A Meditation on Borders, in 
IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 
244, 246 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). 
 75 See Jain, supra note 11, at 1467 (noting that “simple deterrence” is one rationale behind 
heightened immigration enforcement efforts in the Trump Administration); see also Broeders & 
Engbersen, supra note 12, at 1593 (describing, in the European context, how this strategy “is meant 
to complicate and frustrate living and working conditions to such a degree that [irregular migrants] 
will turn around and try their luck elsewhere”). 
 76 See Jain, supra note 11, at 1490; Park, supra note 43, at 1880-82. 
 77 Jain, supra note 11, at 1493 (describing factors such as having U.S.-citizen children, 
attenuated connections to their countries of origin, the financial costs of leaving, and the perceived 
low risk of detection if they continue to lay low). 
 78 See Broeders & Engbersen, supra note 12, at 1596 (“Panopticon Europe is designed as a 
‘factory of exclusion and of people habituated to their status of the excluded’” (quoting Godfried 
Engbersen, The Unanticipated Consequences of Panopticon Europe. Residence Strategies of Illegal 
Immigrants, in CONTROLLING A NEW MIGRATION WORLD 222, 242 (Virginie Guiraudon & Christian 
Joppke eds., 2001))); Kalhan supra note 10, at 60-61 (describing the expansion of interior 
immigration enforcement as “a kind of immigration panopticism, which eliminates zones in society 
where immigration status is invisible and irrelevant”). 
 79 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244-45 (2010) (describing the economic and humanitarian rationales for 
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration system). 
 80 Id. at 244 (“Prosecutorial discretion extends to decisions about which offenses or populations 
to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and arrest; whether to detain or to release a noncitizen; whether 
to initiate removal proceedings; whether to execute a removal order; and various other decisions.”). 
 81 Jain, supra note 11, at 1503 (“The vast majority of undocumented migrants do not experience 
removal; what they instead experience is uncertainty about how and when immigration enforcement 
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relates to unenforced82 or proposed83 immigration laws or policies. Noncitizens 
anticipating increased surveillance may reduce their interactions outside the 
home.84 A third source of uncertainty is mixed messaging about immigration 
policies from official and unofficial sources.85 For example, policymakers need not 
even propose new immigration laws or policies to encourage health care system 
avoidance; public rhetoric, media reports, and rumors can have the same effect.86 
Finally, immigration law is complex and can be difficult for laypeople to interpret 
without legal assistance.87 The overall effect of uncertainty about the law is to 
make noncitizens more cautious, including when deciding whether to seek health 
care or coverage, even when serious injuries or illnesses are involved.88 
The Trump Administration heightened immigration enforcement in numerous 
ways, contributing to the climate of fear for noncitizens and motivating them to 
disenroll from or forgo health care and coverage, as described in Part I.89 Such 
 
may unfold.”). 
 82 See KLINE, supra note 44, at 60 (describing how the Georgia legislature’s passage of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (“H.B. 87”), which expanded immigration 
policing, promoted fear in immigrant communities even when provisions were unenforced). 
 83 Taylor, supra note 41, at 8 (“Political climates created by the social climate during the time 
of the attempt to pass a law, regardless of whether the law is ever actually passed, can also affect 
health outcomes.”). 
 84 Id. at 8 (describing how laws that are never passed or policies that are never finalized can 
negatively affect noncitizens’ health outcomes, making access to timely and quality health care even 
more important). 
 85 See Meyer, supra note 59 (stating that “official policy pronouncements [assuring noncitizens 
that immigration enforcement will not occur at health care sites] likely will do little to quell word-
of-mouth alarms spread in frightened immigrant communities”). 
 86 Jain, supra note 11, at 1489; see also KLINE, supra note 44, at 45, 60 (noting, in the context 
of H.B. 87 in Georgia, that the latter methods may be considered socially acceptable expressions of 
nativism that are also politically expedient and symbolically powerful). 
 87 Hacker et al., supra note 2, at 176, 178. 
 88 Callaghan et al., supra note 23, at 345 (describing a “hyper-vigilance” that occurs in 
undocumented immigrant communities); Hailey Cleek, Sanctuary Clinics: Using the Patient-
Physician Relationship to Discuss Immigration Policy as a Public Health Concern, 53 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 979, 989-90 (2018) (describing how uncertainty is warranted based on officer-level and state-
level inconsistencies in enforcing immigration laws); Van Natta, supra note 21, at 112411. Khiara 
Bridges examines this phenomenon in a parallel context: the illusion of privacy rights for poor, 
pregnant women. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 11 (2017) (arguing that 
they have “no effective privacy rights” in health settings that are perceived as threatening, hostile, 
and unsafe). 
 89 See, e.g., SAMANTHA ARTIGA & PETRY UBRI, KAISER FAM. FOUND., LIVING IN AN IMMIGRANT 
FAMILY IN AMERICA: HOW FEAR AND TOXIC STRESS ARE AFFECTING DAILY LIFE, WELL-BEING, & 
HEALTH 1, 5 (2017); Lee et al., supra note 15, at 1-2 (describing noncitizens’ fears of seeking testing 
and treatment for COVID-19 as “an unfortunate consequence of the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
propagated in the past few years”); Lutz, supra note 68 (quoting a physician in Brownsville, Texas, 
who said that “[u]nder Trump, the climate for undocumented immigrants who need health care is 
‘probably the worst’ in the last decade”); Meyer, supra note 59 (“Providers and others who work in 
immigrant communities say anxieties have spiked in the wake of President Donald Trump’s 
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behavior by noncitizens was not irrational, as these policy changes increased the 
likelihood that leaving the house for any reason, including to seek health care, 
would risk immigration surveillance.90 For example, physicians have observed that 
immigration enforcement operations at or near health care institutions increased in 
the year after Trump’s inauguration.91 During this period, a reporter documented 
how immigration agents along the U.S.-Mexico border were less likely to exercise 
discretion to not deport parents of ill or injured children who were travelling 
through internal Border Patrol checkpoints to access health care.92 
As the next Section describes, the framework of immigration surveillance that 
enabled the Trump Administration’s enforcement crackdown developed over 
decades.93 Specifically, laws and policies governing publicly funded health and 
welfare services have historically enhanced immigration agencies’ ability to 
identify “undeserving” or threatening noncitizens.94 Political support for nativism 
is cyclical, which predictably results in anti-immigrant sentiments expressed 
through restrictions on health and welfare benefits.95 The problems associated with 
 
election.”); Super, supra note 5, at 548 (describing how the Trump Administration’s public charge 
rule “would powerfully coerce families not to seek needed subsistence benefits if any of their 
members is not a citizen”); Van Natta, supra note 21, at 112415 (documenting health care providers’ 
observations that, after the 2016 election, it became more difficult to put noncitizen patients at ease 
because of the difficulty of obtaining timely information about policy changes). Researchers have 
documented how heightened immigration enforcement in other contexts can create a climate of fear 
and motivate health care system avoidance. See, e.g., Hardy et al., supra note 31, at 1251-52 (“Broad 
application of enforcement practices has been shown to negatively affect health care seeking 
behaviors and access to health care in the U.S.-Mexico border communities and throughout the 
United States.”). 
 90 See Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration 
Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 435 (2018) (“Across the United States, immigration 
enforcement in 2017 took a sharp turn in a less nuanced and more draconian direction.”); Lutz, supra 
note 68 (quoting a Texas immigration attorney in 2018 on the “alarming increase in the number of 
undocumented people . . . detained and deported at checkpoints while traveling to receive medical 
treatment for themselves or family members”). 
 91 Saadi & McKee, supra note 64, at k2178. 
 92 Lutz, supra note 68. 
 93 See, e.g., Kalhan, supra note 10 (describing the gradual expansion of immigration 
surveillance activities). 
 94 PARK, supra note 1, at 116; Castañeda, supra note 37, at 42 (“Efforts to limit health care have 
remained a standard and predictable tool for enforcing immigration control in the United States.”); 
Pham, supra note 32, at 798-99 (describing federal legislation and a regulation proposed in 2004 that, 
together, would have required hospitals requesting federal reimbursement for uncompensated care to 
ask patients about immigration status and share information with ICE). 
 95 KLINE, supra note 44, at 43, 129 (noting that “immigration enforcement laws represented 
smaller, rationalized ways of reducing health care to certain populations,” and explaining how 
Georgia’s passage of HB87 was linked to the state’s economic decline and “immigrant 
scapegoating”); Castañeda, supra note 37, at 42 (describing how even progressive laws such as the 
Affordable Care Act “classify and stereotype undocumented immigrants as illegal, immoral, and 
undeserving outsiders” by excluding them from its benefits). 
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immigration surveillance in health care long preceded the Trump Administration 
and will outlast it as well, as indicated by continuing reports of noncitizens refusing 
the COVID-19 vaccine based on fears that receiving it could lead to deportation.96 
B. Legal Framework 
This Section provides an overview of the laws and policies governing 
immigration surveillance in health care. It begins by analyzing the circumstances 
in which surveillance of noncitizens seeking health care at provider sites is 
permitted and when it is discouraged. Next, it describes the laws and policies that 
require or permit information about noncitizens’ use of publicly funded health 
programs to be shared with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Although there are some confidentiality protections for noncitizens who disclose 
information in order to obtain health care, the gaps and exceptions that permit 
information-sharing motivate immigration-related health care system avoidance. 
These analyses reveal the inevitability of widespread fears of immigration 
surveillance in health care among noncitizens. Throughout the Section, 
explanations are proposed for why these fears, rather than the letter of the law 
alone, primarily guide noncitizens’ decisions about accessing health care. 
1. Surveillance at Health Care Provider Sites 
This subsection describes the laws and policies that govern immigration 
surveillance of noncitizens at, near, or en route to health care provider sites. First, 
it analyzes protections and exceptions in DHS’s “sensitive locations” policies, 
concluding that immigration authorities have wide discretion to interpret and apply 
the policies as they see fit. In addition, the policies lack adequate accountability 
measures for violations and are merely executive directives that can be rescinded 
if the President prefers a different approach. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
noncitizens do not trust the sensitive locations policies to protect them from 
immigration enforcement at health care provider sites. Next, it turns to an 
 
 96 See, e.g., Juan Alfonso Nunez, Undocumented Texans Are Eligible for the Vaccine. That 
Doesn’t Mean They’re Accessing It., TEX. MONTHLY (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.texasmonthly.
com/news-politics/many-undocumented-texans-eligible-for-covid-vaccine-but-not-accessing-it/; 
see also PARK, supra note 1, at 82 (warning, in the context of revised public charge regulations in 
2011, of “[t]he need for constant vigilance of state practices, particularly with respect to immigrant 
populations, regardless of which political party [holds] state office”); Pham, supra note 32, at 779 
(observing, in 2008, “a growing trend to shift some enforcement responsibilities onto private parties,” 
such as public benefit agencies); Super, supra note 5, at 562 (describing a San Diego County policy 
in the late 1990s that would “report to immigration authorities every family receiving TANF-funded 
cash assistance or SNAP in which there was a member not receiving benefits whose immigration 
status was unknown or was thought to be unlawful unless the entire family . . . disenrolled by a certain 
date”). 
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examination of health care information privacy laws and the extent to which they 
protect disclosure of information contained in noncitizens’ medical records. It 
reveals why, notwithstanding the laws protecting patients’ information from 
disclosure, noncitizens may be concerned about creating health care records that 
could potentially be disclosed to immigration authorities. 
a. “Sensitive Locations” Policies 
This subsection analyzes the effectiveness of DHS’s sensitive locations 
policies at assuring noncitizens that they can go to health care sites without fear of 
surveillance. These policies, which limit enforcement activities at “sensitive 
locations,” only partially shield noncitizens from immigration surveillance when 
they are physically at or near health care sites. Because the policies fail to define 
key terms with precision, contain numerous exceptions, can be rescinded quickly 
and easily by federal administrators, and lack adequate accountability measures, 
they do not completely assuage noncitizens’ fears of being arrested while seeking 
health care. 
It may be inferred from a review of DHS materials that discouraging system 
avoidance by noncitizens is one of the goals of the sensitive locations policies. 
DHS’s subagencies responsible for immigration enforcement, ICE and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have similar — but not identical — policies 
limiting the conduct of immigration enforcement activities at “sensitive 
locations.”97 Precedent for a policy that limits immigration enforcement at certain 
sites in order to avoid potential harm to the community dates to no later than 
1993.98 A 2008 version of the ICE policy describes it as “strik[ing] a balance 
between our law enforcement responsibilities and the public’s confidence in the 
way ICE executes its mission” and “ensur[ing] that our personnel conduct 
enforcement operations in a manner that is safe and respectful of all persons.”99 
The ICE policy currently in effect was established in 2011, and states that it is 
intended to “make substantial efforts to avoid unnecessarily alarming local 
 
 97 Memorandum from David V. Aguilar, Deputy Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., on 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Enforcement Actions at or Near Certain Community Locations 
1-2 (Jan. 18, 2013), http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/US_Border.pdf [hereinafter CBP 
Sensitive Locations Policy]; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on 
Enforcement Actions at or Focused on Sensitive Locations 1-2 (Oct. 24, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf [hereinafter ICE Sensitive 
Locations Policy]. 
 98 See Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, on 
Field Guidance on Enforcement Actions or Investigative Activities At or Near Sensitive Community 
Locations 1 (July 3, 2008) (citing a 1993 INS policy directing officers to “avoid apprehension of 
persons . . . on the premises of schools, places of worship, funerals and other religious ceremonies”). 
 99 Id. at 1. 
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communities.”100 An ICE website addressing frequently asked questions about the 
policy provides the clearest statement of purpose: “[T]o enhance public 
understanding and trust, and to ensure that people seeking to participate in 
activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so, 
without fear or hesitation.”101 Preventing harm to community members who would 
avoid using services at a sensitive location based on a fear of deportation is a clear 
goal of the policy. 
The ICE and CBP policies each list examples of sensitive locations, including 
“hospitals,”102 but it is unclear whether the agencies would consider other sites 
where people obtain health care to be sensitive locations.103 The ICE FAQ website 
provides some guidance, stating that, in addition to hospitals, the following health 
care sites are treated as sensitive locations: “doctors’ offices, accredited health 
clinics, and emergent or urgent care facilities.”104 In March 2020 — after receiving 
inquiries from advocacy groups, members of Congress, and the press about 
changes to enforcement practices due to the COVID-19 pandemic105 — ICE issued 
a statement citing its sensitive locations policy and noting that “[i]ndividuals 
should not avoid seeking medical care because they fear civil immigration 
enforcement.”106 However, there was no indication that other sites where 
noncitizens may access health care or related services — such as “unaccredited” 
health clinics, pharmacies, health fairs, or COVID-19 testing sites — are 
considered sensitive locations.107 This lack of clarity undermines noncitizens’ 
 
 100 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. 
 101 FAQs: Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/ero/sensitive-loc (last updated May 19, 2021). 
 102 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy supra note 97, at 2; CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra 
note 97, at 1. 
 103 Both policies assure personnel that they have discretion to treat additional sites as sensitive 
locations. CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 1 (urging personnel consider whether a 
location not listed is “similar in nature, description, or function”); ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, 
supra note 97, at 2 (“This is not an exclusive list . . . .”). 
 104 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 101. Some advocacy organizations note that 
CBP also considers such sites to be sensitive locations, citing to a CBP website addressing frequently 
asked questions. See, e.g., REBECCA ULLRICH & NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S “SENSITIVE LOCATIONS” POLICIES 1 (2018), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/06/2018_sensitive 
locationsdetailed.pdf. However, at the time of this writing, no such website existed. 
 105 See Jawetz & Chung, supra note 68. 
 106 Updated ICE Statement on COVID-19, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/updated-ice-statement-covid-19 (Jan. 13, 2021) (confirming that 
the sensitive locations policy applied to the health care sites listed on the FAQ website). 
 107 See Flores et al., supra note 66 (discussing dismissive tweets from a DHS spokesperson in 
response to concerns about immigration enforcement at health care and testing sites). In February 
2021, DHS issued a statement “encourag[ing] all individuals, regardless of immigration status, to 
receive the COVID-19 vaccine once eligible under local distribution guidelines” and noting that 
neither ICE nor CBP would “conduct enforcement operations at or near vaccine distribution sites or 
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confidence that they can avoid immigration surveillance by ICE while seeking 
health care at sites not listed in the ICE FAQ or by CBP at any non-hospital health 
care sites. 
The policies also fail to describe with precision whether immigration 
enforcement actions are permitted within the vicinity of a health care site. This 
leaves noncitizens vulnerable to arrest immediately before or after receiving 
services at a health care site.108 The ICE policy applies to enforcement actions “at 
or focused on” sensitive locations,109 and notes that personnel should seek 
guidance from their supervisors if an enforcement operation “could reasonably be 
viewed as being at or near a sensitive location.”110 Similarly, the CBP policy 
applies to enforcement activities “at or near” sensitive locations.111 Confusion 
about how the policies apply is justified,112 especially given media coverage of 
arrests occurring “near” unquestionably sensitive locations like hospitals.113 In 
response to outcry over the arrest of a teenager at a bus stop just outside of a 
hospital in Portland, Oregon, an ICE spokesperson defended the action by arguing 
that the bus stop was not technically on hospital property.114 Such public 
justifications of enforcement actions that plainly violate the intent of the sensitive 
locations policies sow distrust and generate more fear in immigrant communities. 
Another source of potential confusion in DHS’s sensitive location policies is 
that ICE and CBP regulate enforcement activities at sensitive locations differently. 
The ICE policy applies to arrests, interviews, searches, and surveillance conducted 
for purposes of immigration enforcement.115 It permits ICE officers to conduct a 
range of investigatory activities that may ultimately lead to immigration 
enforcement actions, including requesting records, providing notice to employees, 
 
clinics.” DHS Statement on Equal Access to COVID-19 Vaccines and Vaccine Distribution Sites, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-statement-equal-
access-covid-19-vaccines-and-vaccine-distribution-sites. 
 108 See Licon, supra note 63 (noting that ICE and CBP sometimes bring noncitizens to the 
hospital for treatment and then detain them after they are discharged). 
 109 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. 
 110 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The policy also provides guidance to personnel if, during an 
enforcement action, they are “led to or near a sensitive location.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 111 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 1. 
 112 Meyer, supra note 59 (noting that the policy “appears to offer the agency some flexibility 
in where it can conduct raids”). 
 113 ULLRICH & NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 104, at 3-4; La Charite et al., supra note 63, 
at 55 (noting that their “alarming” finding that nearly 20% of providers surveyed were aware of 
immigration enforcement occurring at their health care institution “corroborate[s] reporting of such 
events in the media”). 
 114 Katie Shepherd, ICE Arrested an Undocumented Immigrant Just Outside a Portland 
Hospital, WILLAMETTE WK. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.wweek.com/news/ 
courts/2017/10/31/ice-arrested-an-undocumented-immigrant-just-outside-a-portland-hospital/. 
 115 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 1. 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 20:1 (2021) 
26 
serving subpoenas, or attending functions or meetings.116 ICE officer presence at 
health care sites for any reason, such as to request information about noncitizens 
or to attend events, is likely sufficient to chill noncitizens from accessing services 
at that site. CBP’s policy does not specify the meaning of enforcement actions, but 
it appears to limit officers’ conduct of investigatory activities more than the ICE 
policy.117 Since noncitizens do not know which agency may be surveilling them, 
they must assume that the less protective policy always applies. 
Further undermining their goal of assuring noncitizens that it is safe to access 
health care, the ICE and CBP sensitive locations policies permit enforcement 
activities at sensitive locations in a wide range of circumstances.118 First, ICE and 
CBP officers may request to carry out an enforcement action at or near a sensitive 
location and a senior DHS official may approve such action at their discretion.119 
There are no limitations on a DHS official’s ability to approve such actions, merely 
exhortations to “take extra care” to assess potential disruptions to a sensitive 
location’s operations.120 The ICE policy provides an example of when an 
enforcement action at a sensitive location may be approved: “if the only known 
address of a target is at or near a sensitive location.”121 A second exception to the 
sensitive locations policies applies when “exigent circumstances” exist; in such 
cases, officers need not obtain prior approval to conduct enforcement activities at 
sensitive locations.122 Exigent circumstances include situations involving national 
security, terrorism, imminent risks to public safety, and the “imminent risk of 
destruction of evidence material to an ongoing criminal case.”123 Even if one agrees 
that enforcement action at health care sites should be permitted in exigent 
circumstances, the chilling effects of such actions will reverberate unless details of 
the circumstances are shared with the community. Third, CBP may conduct 
enforcement actions in hospitals when noncitizens who are already in their custody 
must be hospitalized.124 Fourth, both CBP and ICE may conduct enforcement 
 
 116 Id. at 1. 
 117 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 1 (describing how “investigative 
activities” at or near sensitive locations must receive written approval from senior CBP officials). 
 118 See Lee et al., supra note 15, at 6 (noting that the policy “is not applied evenly in the U.S.”). 
 119 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2 (listing the officials from whom ICE 
officers must obtain prior approval); CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 1 (same). 
 120 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. See CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, 
supra note 97, at 1 (directing officers to “consider alternative measures that could achieve the 
enforcement objective without causing significant disruption to the normal activities or operations” 
of the sensitive location). 
 121 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. 
 122 Id. at 2; CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. 
 123 ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2-3. See CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, 
supra note 97, at 2. 
 124 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. See Licon, supra note 63 (describing 
the policy as “discretionary and ambiguous when an enforcement action begins before a trip to a 
HEALTH CARE SANCTUARIES 
27 
actions at or near international borders, including the “functional equivalent” of a 
border.125 The CBP policy specifies, additionally, that enforcement activities “that 
bear nexus to the border” may occur at sensitive locations.126 The border exception 
to the sensitive locations policy is too vague for noncitizens to determine when it 
can be invoked. However, it explains how CBP agents in Texas were able to follow 
ten-year-old Rosa Maria Hernandez, who was in an ambulance, from a border 
checkpoint to the hospital, surveil her from within the hospital, and arrest her in 
her hospital bed immediately upon discharge without violating its sensitive 
locations policy.127 Communities along the U.S.-Mexico border have been hit hard 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, and as of this writing, there is still no assurance from 
DHS that people passing through interior U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints to seek 
health care during the pandemic will be spared from immigration enforcement.128 
Fifth, the sensitive locations policies do not apply to local law enforcement officers 
who cooperate with ICE to perform immigration enforcement activities under the 
287(g) program.129 This exception explains how Blanca Borrego was arrested in 
an exam room at her gynecologist’s office.130 
 
hospital or when an immigrant is already in custody”). 
 125 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2; U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra 
note 101 (stating that the policy does not apply to operations “within the immediate vicinity of the 
international border”). The functional equivalent of a border is “the first practical detention point 
after a border crossing or the final port of entry.” YULE KIM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., PROTECTING THE 
U.S. PERIMETER: BORDER SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 7 (2009). 
 126 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. 
 127 See Government Releases 10-Year-Old Rosa Maria Hernandez After ACLU Files Lawsuit, 
ACLU (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/government-releases-10-year-old-rosa-
maria-hernandez-after-aclu-files-lawsuit; see also Licon, supra note 63 (describing a case in which 
a person fainted after her family was pulled over by CBP agents in Florida and was subsequently 
surveilled at the hospital). In September 2020, an undocumented teenager was detained in the hospital 
under similar circumstances, before being transferred to a detention facility and placed in removal 
proceedings. Her aunt, also undocumented, who accompanied her to the hospital was also arrested 
and detained separately by ICE. Montoya-Galvez, supra note 66. 
 128 See Memorandum from Carla L. Provost, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs 
& Border Prot., on Medical Conveyances Transiting Through Checkpoints 1 (Jan. 5, 2018) (noting 
that only “[m]edical conveyances engaged in immediate emergency operations should always receive 
expedited transit through or around a checkpoint”); Jawetz & Chung, supra note 68 (urging DHS to 
issue such a statement). See also Maya Srikrishnan, Border Patrol Activity in Rural North County 
Alarms Farmworkers, Advocates, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/immigration-enforcement-efforts-in-rural-
north-county-alarm-farmworkers-advocates/ (suggesting that enforcement activity at interior 
checkpoints has increased since the COVID-19 pandemic began, including at checkpoints that some 
communities must traverse to access hospitals). 
 129 The 287(g) program deputizes state and local law enforcement agencies to perform certain 
immigration law enforcement actions. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) 
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated May 20, 2021), 
https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g. 
 130 See supra text accompanying note 58. 
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The DHS sensitive locations policies are best characterized as agency 
guidance — not enforceable law — without strong accountability measures. Both 
policies state that they do not create a private right of action or any rights 
enforceable by law.131 On its website, ICE describes a process by which people 
may report ICE actions that they believe are inconsistent with its sensitive 
locations policy.132 However, neither the policies nor the agencies’ websites 
describe the steps they will take after receiving a complaint. Also, because the 
policies do not describe any recourse for noncitizens who were arrested during an 
enforcement operation that violated any of the policies, there is no guarantee that 
individual officers or the agencies will be held accountable for violations in any 
way.133 
Finally, even though the sensitive locations policies are relatively 
longstanding, they are not codified in law. The CBP policy reminds the reader that 
it “may be modified, superseded, or rescinded by CBP at any time without 
notice.”134 Both policies may be immediately modified or rescinded by senior DHS 
officials through issuance of a memorandum. 
Overall, these features of the sensitive locations policies undermine their 
purpose of assuaging noncitizens’ fears of accessing community services. Because 
so many important decisions are left to the individual discretion of immigration 
agency personnel — from what is considered a sensitive location, to how far from 
the site enforcement may occur, to whether exigent circumstances exist — the 
guarantee that the sensitive locations policies intend to provide is no guarantee at 
all. Considering the lack of clarity in the sensitive locations policies, the inadequate 
accountability for violations, and the absence of meaningful recourse for victims 
of policy violations, it should not be surprising to find that noncitizens take pains 
to avoid going to the doctor. 
b. Health Information Privacy 
Health information privacy laws protect citizens and noncitizens alike; 
however, noncitizens may have unique concerns that lead them to doubt the 
confidentiality of the information they share with health care providers. Fears that 
 
 131 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2; ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra 
note 97, at 3. 
 132 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 101 (describing how to report violations to ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations or the Civil Liberties Division of the ICE Office of Diversity 
and Civil Rights). Advocacy groups recommend reporting violations by CBP to the CBP Information 
Center. See ULLRICH & NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 104, at 6 (providing a phone number and 
website). 
 133 See ULLRICH & NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 104, at 5 (“Without adequate 
accountability measures, ICE and CBP are effectively responsible for policing themselves.”). 
 134 CBP Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 2. 
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information disclosed or inadvertently revealed to health care providers may be 
shared with immigration authorities can discourage some noncitizens from seeking 
health care. 
Health care providers are generally prohibited from disclosing personal 
information about their patients, which should be interpreted to include 
information about immigration-related matters so long as there is some 
relationship between the information and the provision of health care. The federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rules 
outline the protection of patient-specific information defined as “protected health 
information” (PHI).135 The definition of PHI is broad and includes most but not all 
patient information that is within a health care provider’s possession.136 Health care 
providers may not typically have reason to inquire about patients’ citizenship or 
immigration status, but such information can be clinically relevant.137 Although 
there is very little case law analyzing whether certain categories of information 
constitute PHI and no case law addressing the question of whether immigration 
status should be considered PHI,138 it is reasonable to argue that immigration status 
information should be considered PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rules as long as 
a connection could be made to the patient’s health condition, the provision of 
health care to the patient, or the payment for health care provided to the patient.139 
However, because immigration status information is not explicitly protected under 
 
 135 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2021). 
 136 PHI is most “individually identifiable health information” that is “transmitted or maintained 
in any . . . form or medium,” with limited exceptions. Id. Individually identifiable health information 
is defined as “a subset of health information, including demographic information collected from an 
individual, and: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health 
care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health condition 
of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment 
for the provisions of health care to an individual; and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With 
respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the 
individual.” Id. See OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE 
REGARDING METHODS FOR DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) 
PRIVACY RULE 5-6 (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.hhs.gov
/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/Deidentification/hhs_deid_guid
ance.pdf (indicating that, to assess whether information constitutes PHI, “[t]he relationship with 
health information is fundamental,” and “[i]dentifying information alone, such as personal names, 
residential addresses, or phone numbers, would not necessarily be designated as PHI”). 
 137 Scott J. Schweikart, Should Immigration Status Information Be Considered Protected 
Health Information?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS 32, 35 (2019). For example, it could come up during the 
medical history, in a screening for social determinants of health, when a patient requests medical 
evidence to support an immigration application, or to assist the patient with obtaining publicly funded 
health insurance. 
 138 Id. at 34. 
 139 Id. at 34; Cleek, supra note 88, at 1002 (concluding that disclosure of a patient’s personal 
health information to DHS by a health care provider would likely violate HIPAA). 
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the law, it is a source of uncertainty, and some immigrant advocacy groups advise 
health care providers to avoid documenting immigration-related information in 
medical and billing records.140 
One exception to the HIPAA Privacy Rules that could implicate immigration 
enforcement activities is for disclosures required by law.141 Under HIPAA, health 
care providers are permitted to provide information to law enforcement officials 
when a request is pursuant to a warrant or other court order.142 This might come in 
the form of an administrative subpoena in an immigration matter, issued by an 
Administrative Law Judge of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. ICE 
officers may serve subpoenas or otherwise request records from health care 
providers without violating the ICE sensitive locations policy.143 However, health 
care providers are not obligated to respond to such requests for information under 
HIPAA; disclosure in such cases is merely permitted.144 Providers must read their 
state laws in conjunction with HIPAA in order to understand whether they are 
required to disclose patient information in certain circumstances.145 
Another exception to the HIPAA Privacy Rules that permits health care 
providers to disclose PHI without patient authorization — and that may be a source 
of concern and confusion among undocumented noncitizens in particular — relates 
to the reporting of criminal activity.146 In such cases, “a covered entity may 
disclose to a law enforcement official [PHI] that the covered entity believes in good 
faith constitutes evidence of criminal conduct that occurred on the premises of the 
covered entity.”147 This exception would not apply in the case of an undocumented 
person who comes to a covered entity for the purpose of seeking health care or 
health coverage, because failing to have a valid legal status is not a violation of 
criminal law.148 However, it explains why the health care providers who called the 
police on Blanca Borrego when they suspected that she had provided a fake 
driver’s license as identification were within their rights to do so.149 Importantly, 
 
 140 See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, KNOW YOUR PATIENTS’ RIGHTS 3-4 (2017), 
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Protecting-Access-to-Health-Care-2017-04-
17.pdf. 
 141 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) (2021) (describing the requirements for an administrative 
request). 
 142 § 164.512(f)(1). 
 143 See ICE Sensitive Locations Policy, supra note 97, at 1. 
 144 § 164.512(f)(1); see NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 140, at 2. 
 145 NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 140, at 2. 
 146 § 164.512(f)(5). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Schweikart, supra note 137, at 35. 
 149 See Solomon, supra note 58. Federal regulators determined that the disclosure to law 
enforcement was allowed under HIPAA. However, they fined the health system $2.4 million for 
subsequent disclosures of Borrego’s name to the media after the incident provoked outrage. Mike 
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even if a patient who a provider knows to be undocumented committed a crime on 
the premises of a health clinic, the clinic staff would not be obligated to disclose 
the PHI relating to the patient’s lack of immigration status.150 The exception would 
permit, but not require, disclosure of PHI in that scenario.151 
Finally, HIPAA permits health care providers to disclose PHI when a patient 
authorizes such disclosure, and some noncitizen patients may be required to do so 
as part of an immigration application process. Immigration officers may order a 
medical examination of an applicant for immigration benefits at any time.152 Some 
immigration applicants, such as most LPR applicants, are required to undergo a 
medical examination in order to prove that they are not barred from admissibility 
to the United States for health-related reasons.153 They do this by submitting a form 
that reports the results of a medical examination and that is completed by a doctor 
who is designated as a civil surgeon by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS).154 The completed form includes information relating to communicable 
diseases, any physical or mental health conditions with “associated harmful 
behavior,” substance use disorders, and vaccination history.155 It also includes a 
broad authorization to release information to USCIS from “any and all . . . records” 
that may be necessary to determine eligibility for the immigration benefit sought, 
and requires the applicant to authorize the release of the information in the form to 
 
Hixenbaugh, Memorial Hermann to Pay $2.4M after Sharing Patient Name in Press Release, 
CHRON.COM (May 10, 2017), https://www.chron.com/local/prognosis/article/Memorial-Hermann-to-
pay-feds-2-4-million-after-11136432.php. The health system also agreed to implement policy 
changes to avoid breaches of patient privacy in the future. Id.; see also Michele Goodwin & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270, 1285 (2018) (commenting 
that Borrego’s case illustrates the impotency of the medical privacy rights she supposedly possessed). 
 150 Schweikart, supra note 137, at 35. 
 151 See Song, supra note 6, at 41-42 (highlighting the permissive aspect of the law enforcement 
exceptions in HIPAA). Although the patient’s lack of immigration status may subsequently be 
discovered by law enforcement and shared with ICE, the likelihood that they will be subject to 
immigration enforcement as a result depends on the extent to which the jurisdiction cooperates with 
ICE and the seriousness of the crime. See, e.g., Immigration 101: What is a Sanctuary City?, 
AMERICA’S VOICE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://americasvoice.org/blog/what-is-a-sanctuary-city/. Some 
who are opposed to immigration surveillance in health care generally may argue that it is justified 
when it is alleged that a serious crime has occurred at a health care site. See discussion, supra note 
9. 
 152 See Chapter 3 – Applicability of Medical Examination and Vaccination Requirement, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (May 28, 2021) https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-
b-chapter-3 (citing Matter of Arthur, 16 I. & N. Dec. 558 (B.I.A. 1978)). 
 153 See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(a)(1)-(7), 66 Stat. 163, 
182 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2018)). 
 154 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., FORM I-693, REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND 
VACCINATION RECORD 1, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-693.pdf. 
 155 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION 
AND VACCINATION RECORD 6 (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-
693instr.pdf. 
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any entity or person for immigration enforcement purposes.156 Although, in this 
case, health information is being disclosed for a narrow purpose, the perception 
that private physicians are complicit with the administration and enforcement of 
immigration law may have a chilling effect. 
Noncitizens’ beliefs that their health care information is less protected under 
the law than the law mandates may be informed by knowledge of how health care 
institutions have participated in immigration enforcement in the past, anecdotal 
evidence of health care provider complicity with immigration enforcement in the 
present, and the general policy climate. Historically, state medical officials and 
hospital staff have identified noncitizens who were deportable based on mental 
health grounds, serving as important sources of information to immigration 
authorities.157 In the current policy climate, in which undocumented noncitizens 
are cautiously optimistic about proposed immigration reforms after four years of 
heightened enforcement, accessing health care may still seem fraught with danger. 
For example, when the COVID-19 vaccination distribution began in early 
December 2020, state governors, state health officials, members of Congress, and 
others raised concerns about provisions in the Data Use Agreement between states 
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) because the agreements 
mandated the collection of personal identifiable information and permitted this 
information to be shared with other federal agencies.158 Although the CDC has 
since clarified that it will not seek SSNs, driver’s license numbers, or passport 
numbers — information particularly likely to chill noncitizens from participation 
— and that vaccine administration data will not be used for immigration 
enforcement purposes,159 health care providers and advocates for immigrants 
continue to report that noncitizens are afraid to obtain the vaccine.160 News stories 
reporting that health care providers have declined to provide vaccines to 
 
 156 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 154, at 2. 
 157 Polly J. Price, Infecting the Body Politic: Observations on Health Security and the 
“Undesirable” Immigrant, 63 KAN. L. REV. 917, 938, 940 (2015). 
 158 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Some States Balk After C.D.C. Asks for Personal Data of 
Those Vaccinated, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
12/08/us/politics/cdc-vaccine-data-privacy.html. 
 159 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DATA USE AND SHARING AGREEMENT TO 
SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S COVID-19 EMERGENCY RESPONSE JURISDICTION 
IMMUNIZATION AND VACCINE ADMINISTRATION DATA AGREEMENT 24 app. G (n.d.), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/reporting/downloads/vaccine-administration-data-
agreement.pdf. 
 160 See, e.g., Jazmin Orozco Rodriguez, Battling an Information Access Gap, State and Local 
Campaigns Work to Provide COVID-19 Vaccine Information to Latinos, NEV. INDEP. (Feb. 14, 
2021), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/battling-an-information-access-gap-state-and-
local-campaigns-work-to-provide-covid-19-vaccine-information-to-latinos (describing a targeted 
campaign in Nevada designed to address noncitizens’ concerns such as “whether their private 
information will be shared and whether receiving the vaccine could affect their immigration status”). 
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noncitizens who are not able to provide a SSN increase fear and confusion in 
immigrant communities.161 Even a direct statement from DHS supporting “equal 
access to the COVID-19 vaccines and vaccine distribution sites for undocumented 
immigrants” appears to be insufficient to overcome noncitizens’ learned fears of 
immigration surveillance in health care.162 
2. Surveillance of Publicly Funded Health Care Programs 
This subsection describes the laws and policies that permit and prohibit 
information-sharing between the agencies that administer publicly funded health 
programs and DHS. These agencies collect a wide range of personal data about 
applicants, including immigration status. Under certain circumstances, 
immigration authorities can access this data, putting certain immigration 
applications in jeopardy and placing some noncitizens at increased risk of 
deportation. An analysis of the law validates some of noncitizens’ beliefs that 
information about their enrollment in Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP), or insurance from the ACA Marketplace can compromise future 
immigration processes. However, it also reveals that fears of negative immigration 
consequences from enrolling in publicly funded health coverage are greater than 
warranted for many noncitizens. 
Public benefit agencies possess a broad array of sensitive, personal 
information about applicants and recipients. Applications for Medicaid, “the single 
largest source of health coverage in the United States,”163 typically request names, 
birthdates, SSNs, home and work addresses and telephone numbers, marital status, 
citizenship or immigration status, race and ethnicity, income, assets, certain 
household expenses, and tax filing information for every member of an applicant’s 
household, as well as each household member’s relationship to the applicant.164 In 
 
 161 See, e.g., Anastasiya Bolton, Rio Grande Valley Man Denied COVID Vaccine Due to 
Citizenship Status, KHOU.COM (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.khou.com/article/news/deep-dive-
texas/covid-vaccine-denied-citizenship/285-705a8c14-80ca-4eca-b83b-a94e43cedd9a (noting that 
at least fourteen people were turned away from the vaccine site for this reason). 
 162 DHS Statement on Equal Access to COVID-19 Vaccines and Vaccine Distribution Sites, 
supra note 107. 
 163 Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2021). 
 164 See, e.g., PA. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., PENNSYLVANIA APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS (n.d.), 
https://www.dhs.pa.gov/Services/Assistance/Documents/Benefits%20Applications/ 
PA-600-2-20-Final.pdf. In addition, applications may request information about a wide range of life 
circumstances, such as whether the applicant or household members are in school, the U.S. military, 
foster care, or treatment for drug or alcohol abuse; if they are pregnant, disabled, or survivors of 
domestic abuse; and if they have been disqualified from benefits in the past, have unpaid medical 
bills, have been offered health insurance from an employer, or have had health insurance coverage 
in the past. Id. Applicants are not required to submit all such information for household members 
who are not to be included in the application, even though there is space to provide it on the 
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order to qualify for certain categories of Medicaid or to obtain federal 
reimbursement for treatment of emergency medical conditions through emergency 
Medicaid, applicants must provide detailed information about medical diagnoses 
and treatments. Public benefits agencies possess a record of current and past 
recipients’ applications for and enrollment in public benefits. Finally, all of the 
major subsidized health coverage programs — Medicaid, CHIP, and insurance on 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Health Insurance Marketplace — require 
noncitizen applicants to provide proof of a valid immigration status.165 
The primary way in which immigration authorities access information about 
noncitizens held by public benefits agencies is by compelling noncitizens to 
authorize the release of such information. This occurs when certain noncitizens 
apply to become LPRs, an immigration process. The public charge law restricts 
the ability of certain noncitizens to become LPRs if they are considered likely to 
become dependent on the U.S. government for support. New regulations — 
anticipated from the first days of the Trump Administration in 2017, finalized by 
DHS in 2019, and rescinded in 2021 — expanded the scope of the law in many 
ways, including by adding Medicaid to the list of public benefits considered in the 
public charge analysis. The 2019 regulations chilled noncitizens from applying for 
Medicaid — even those who are exempt from the public charge determination 
altogether or whose use of public benefits would not be considered as a negative 
factor in the public charge analysis. Similarly, Trump-era policies relating to 
immigration sponsorship have discouraged noncitizens from enrolling in public 
benefits by increasing the risk that enrolling in such benefits will have immigration 
consequences. Finally, the Trump Administration’s novel interpretations of what 
is considered “fraud” in immigration applications raised fears that any information 
submitted to public benefits agencies would be scrutinized and potentially used as 
a pretext for immigration enforcement activities. 
Both DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have 
long acknowledged that collaboration between public benefits agencies and 
immigration authorities will chill noncitizen enrollment in public benefits and have 
thus taken some steps to counter it,166 but the law still permits information sharing 
in certain circumstances. The laws relating to public charge determinations, 
 
application. See, e.g., id. at 2 (noting, for sections of the application relating to household members, 
“[a]nswer the questions below if you are applying for this person”). 
 165 See Social Security Act of 1935 § 1137(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(d) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 
18081(b)(2) (2018) (providing for the ACA Health Insurance Marketplace); 42 C.F.R. § 457.340(d) 
(2021) (providing for CHIP). The eligibility criteria relating to immigration status for each of these 
programs is different and complex. For an overview, see Medha D. Makhlouf, Laboratories of 
Exclusion: Medicaid, Federalism & Immigrants, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1680, 1699-72 (2020). 
 166 See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, CLARIFICATION OF EXISTING PRACTICES RELATED 
TO CERTAIN HEALTH CARE INFORMATION (2013), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/ice-
aca-memo.pdf. 
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immigration sponsorship, and the fraud exception to privacy protections in public 
benefits applications were in place prior to 2017; their impact was simply ratcheted 
up through regulations and rhetoric. Even as the Biden Administration begins to 
undo some of these regulations in the interest of public health, it may struggle to 
regain trust in immigrant communities.167 The chilling effects of the laws still on 
the books — which also preexisted the Trump Administration — will likely persist. 
 
a. Public Charge Determinations 
 
One way in which immigration authorities obtain information about 
noncitizens’ enrollment in public benefit programs is by requiring disclosure of 
this information from noncitizens who are subject to the public charge ground of 
inadmissibility and are applying to become LPRs. If USCIS determines that an 
LPR applicant is likely to become a public charge at any time in the future, their 
application is denied.168 The public charge inadmissibility analysis involves 
weighing numerous factors relating to “age, health, family status, assets, resources 
and financial status, education, and skills, among other factors.”169 One such factor 
is prior receipt of public benefits, including (for a time under the 2019 regulations) 
Medicaid for adults in most eligibility groups.170 LPR applicants must provide this 
information to USCIS under penalty of perjury and authorize USCIS to verify this 
information with the agencies administering the public benefits in question.171 
In order to receive LPRs’ Medicaid enrollment information, USCIS must 
request it — as well as authorization for government agencies to disclose it — from 
LPRs directly, because such information is otherwise protected from disclosure 
 
 167 See, e.g., Orozco Rodriguez, supra note 160 (quoting an organizer with a COVID-19 
vaccination campaign in Nevada who describes fear and mistrust in the Latino immigrant community 
as “las secuelas (the aftermath) of the last administration”). 
 168 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2018). 
 169 Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 28,689, 28,690 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
 170 Letter from Tracy L. Renaud, Senior Off. Performing the Duties of the Dir., U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigr. Servs., to Interagency Partners 1-2 (Apr. 12, 2021), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/notices/SOPDD-Letter-to-USCIS-Interagency-
Partners-on-Public-Charge.pdf. Under the current policy, which is the policy that was in effect prior 
to the 2019 public charge regulations, enrollment in Medicaid is considered only when it is used for 
coverage of long-term institutional care. Id. at 2. Under the 2019 rule, use of Medicaid was not 
considered for noncitizens under the age of 21 and women during pregnancy and for sixty days after 
the pregnancy ends. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,297 (Aug. 
14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 245, 248). Use of emergency Medicaid, a 
reimbursement mechanism for treatment of emergency medical conditions in noncitizens who are 
excluded from Medicaid, was also not considered under the 2019 rule. Id. at 41,384. 
 171 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0023, FORM 
I-485, APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR ADJUST STATUS 13, 15 (2021), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-485.pdf. 
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under federal law. The federal Medicaid statute requires states to safeguard 
information received about Medicaid applicants, beneficiaries, and non-applicant 
household members by restricting disclosure “to purposes directly connected with 
the administration of the plan.”172 Regulations specify that the types of activities 
that are “directly connected with” Medicaid administration are limited to: “(a) 
Establishing eligibility; (b) Determining the amount of medical assistance, (c) 
Providing services for beneficiaries; and (d) Conducting or assisting an 
investigation, prosecution, or civil or criminal proceeding related to administration 
of the [state Medicaid] plan.”173 They further specify the types of information to 
be safeguarded, including names and addresses, SSNs, information used to verify 
income eligibility, medical information, and “[s]ocial and economic conditions or 
circumstances.”174 Providing information to federal immigration authorities about 
a noncitizen’s receipt of Medicaid benefits is not a purpose directly related to 
Medicaid administration.175 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS), the federal agency responsible for administering Medicaid, is required to 
have specific criteria regarding the release and use of information about applicants 
for and beneficiaries of Medicaid, and may only provide access to such information 
to agencies that are subject to standards of confidentiality comparable to CMS’s 
criteria.176 
The major effect of the 2019 public charge regulations was to chill noncitizens 
from applying for public benefit programs, including publicly funded health 
insurance, because of the perception that any use of any public benefit would 
increase the risk that a future immigration application would be denied.177 Many 
sources contribute to this widespread belief among noncitizens — even those 
whose enrollment in Medicaid would not trigger immigration consequences. First, 
there was confusion about how the 2019 public charge regulation applied. Second, 
 
 172 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-7(a)(5), 1396a(a)(7)(A)(i) (2018); 42 C.F.R. § 431.300(b)-(c) (2021) 
(stating that such safeguards apply to non-applicants, in addition to applicants and beneficiaries). 
 173 42 C.F.R. § 431.302 (2021). 
 174 Id. § 431.305. 
 175 See Id. § 431.306(e) (stating that Medicaid agencies’ policies on safeguarding information 
“must apply to all requests for information from outside sources, including governmental bodies, the 
courts, or law enforcement officials”); NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN SELECTED 
FEDERAL BENEFITS PROGRAMS 1-2 (2018), https://www.nilc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/privacy-protections-fed-programs-tbl-2018.pdf (citing Letter from Sally 
Richardson, Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Medicaid Directors (Dec. 17, 1997) (on 
file with National Immigration Law Center); see also 42 C.F.R. § 431.306(f)-(h) (2021) (specifying 
circumstances in which a Medicaid agency may release information to courts or other agencies). 
 176 § 431.306. 
 177 Medha D. Makhlouf & Jasmine Sandhu, Immigrants and Interdependence: How the 
COVID-19 Pandemic Exposes the Folly of the New Public Charge Rule, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 
146, 151 (2020). The 2019 public charge rule stated that merely applying for a public benefit “may 
suggest a likelihood of future receipt” of public benefits. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 
84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,366 (Aug. 14, 2019). 
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there may be confusion about the extent of the privacy protections in Medicaid 
because public benefits agencies are generally permitted and sometimes required 
to disclose information about applicants for other public benefit programs to 
immigration authorities. Third, prior interactions with immigration authorities may 
have left noncitizens distrustful of any official assurances. Consequently, 
noncitizens tend to err on the side of caution and decline to enroll in publicly 
funded health insurance. Each of these sources of belief about public charge are 
examined in detail in the remainder of this subsection. 
For good reason, noncitizens were and remain confused about how the 2019 
public charge rule changed the relationship between enrollment in publicly funded 
health insurance and eligibility for LPR status. The 217-page final rule is so 
complex that it is nearly impenetrable. Basic information about how the rule 
applied — such as who was subject to public charge, whose public benefits use 
was considered in the analysis, and which public benefit programs were considered 
— was frequently misinterpreted.178 For example, CHIP and ACA Marketplace 
coverages were not considered to be public benefits in the public charge 
analysis,179 but it appears that the 2019 regulations chilled noncitizen enrollment 
in those programs as well.180 Misinformation about the operation of the rule was 
rampant, a consequence of its complexity but also of the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
that surrounded its promulgation. Various versions of the rule were leaked to the 
media multiple times before the rule was finalized, stoking fears. Some noncitizens 
declined to enroll in public benefits years before the rule began to be implemented, 
in anticipation of a change in the law that would view such enrollment unfavorably. 
Finally, since immigration officers have broad discretion to weigh an applicant’s 
use of public benefits against other factors in the public charge determination, 
some noncitizens may choose to “play it safe” by avoiding use of public benefits 
at all costs.181 Moreover, despite the fact that the 2019 public charge rule has been 
 
 178 See Makhlouf & Sandhu, supra note 177, at 156. 
 179 In the proposed rule, DHS sought public comments on whether to add CHIP to the list of 
public benefits considered in the analysis. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 
51,114, 51,173-74 (Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, 248). 
 180 See, e.g., KAISER FAM. FOUND., CHANGES TO “PUBLIC CHARGE” INADMISSIBILITY RULE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH COVERAGE 4 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-
Sheet-Changes-to-Public-Charge-Inadmissibility-Rule-Implications-for-Health-and-Health-
Coverage (describing reports of members of immigrant families declining to enroll in or disenrolling 
from CHIP due to fears relating to public charge); Charles Gaba & Emily Gee, How Trump’s Policies 
Have Hurt ACA Marketplace Enrollment, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2020/04/16/483362/trumpspolicies-hurt-
aca-marketplace-enrollment/ (attributing, in part, declines in Marketplace coverage enrollment to the 
new public charge rule). 
 181 Makhlouf & Sandhu, supra note 177, at 156-57; Super, supra note 5, at 556 (describing 
how immigration officers have interpreted public charge inadmissibility unevenly because of the 
broad discretion they have and noting that many immigration attorneys advise their clients to “avoid 
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rescinded, its chilling effects are likely to linger.182 An attempt by a group of state 
attorneys general to defend the 2019 public charge rule, an effort abandoned by 
the Biden Administration, leaves open the possibility that the 2019 rule could be 
implemented again someday.183 
Another reason why noncitizens may believe that enrolling in publicly funded 
health insurance could place future immigration applications at risk is that they are 
not aware of or do not trust the relatively strong privacy protections in the laws 
governing Medicaid,184 CHIP,185 and Marketplace coverage.186 While public 
benefits agencies are restricted from disclosing information about applicants to or 
recipients of these programs for reasons unrelated to program administration, 
privacy protections in other public benefit programs are not as strong. Public 
benefits agencies are required or permitted to disclose information about applicants 
and recipients to immigration authorities in certain circumstances. In 1996, the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
created a new requirement for federal and state agencies administering certain 
federal public benefit programs to report to immigration authorities the names, 
addresses, and other identifying information about people who they know to be 
unlawfully present in the United States.187 Among the programs subject to the 
 
virtually all public benefits”). 
 182 See ALMA GUERRERO ET AL., UCLA LATINO POL’Y & POL. INITIATIVE, FOREGOING 
HEALTHCARE IN A GLOBAL PANDEMIC: THE CHILLING EFFECTS OF THE PUBLIC CHARGE RULE ON 
HEALTH ACCESS AMONG CHILDREN IN CALIFORNIA 4, 6, 12 (2021), https://latino.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/04/LPPI_Foregoing-Healthcare-in-a-Global-Pandemic_04.07.2021.pdf. 
 183 See John Kruzel & Harper Neidig, Supreme Court Rebuffs GOP Bid to Revive Trump’s 
‘Public Charge’ Rule, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2021), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/550244-
supreme-court-rebuffs-gop-bid-to-revive-trumps-public-charge-rule. 
 184 See supra text accompanying notes 172-176. See generally U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
supra note 166 (confirming that information submitted in applications for Medicaid, CHIP, or 
Marketplace coverage are not used for immigration enforcement purposes). 
 185 42 C.F.R. § 457.1110(b) (2021) (requiring CHIP programs to comply with Medicaid’s 
privacy protections). 
 186 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1411(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 18081(g)(2) (2018) 
(stating that information obtained from applicants for coverage through the Health Insurance 
Marketplace must be used for the sole purpose of “ensuring the efficient operation of the Exchange”); 
45 C.F.R. § 155.260(a) (2021) (stating that personally identifiable information may only be used or 
disclosed for specific functions, such as eligibility determination or enrollment in health insurance 
plans); § 155.260(e)(3) (stating that the Marketplace’s data-sharing arrangements with other agencies 
must “[b]e equal to or more stringent than the requirements for Medicaid programs”). 
 187 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) § 404(b), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 608(g), 611a (2018); Responsibility of Certain Entities to Notify the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service of Any Alien Who the Entity “Knows” Is Not Lawfully Present in the United 
States, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,301, 58,302 (Sept. 28, 2000) (clarifying that state public benefits agencies 
subject to the reporting requirement are obligated to report information under this provision only 
when they find, through receipt of a Final Order of Deportation or similar documentation from an 
immigration agency, that an applicant is removable from the United States). The fact that this 
requirement has been interpreted narrowly does not weaken the argument that there are exceptions 
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requirement is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), a program 
for which many Medicaid recipients qualify. Under PRWORA and a similar 
provision in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) designed to facilitate information sharing between state and local 
government and federal immigration authorities, state and local government 
entities and officials may not be restricted by law from sending information about 
a person’s immigration status to federal immigration authorities.188 Although the 
constitutionality of these provisions is currently the subject of a circuit split, they 
remain enforceable in parts of the country.189 Noncitizens’ concerns about the risks 
of engaging with the public benefits system at all are understandable, given that 
privacy protections are uneven among programs. Such concerns are heightened 
when, as in many states, a single public benefits agency administers multiple 
public benefits programs, which often have a single application process. 
Noncitizens’ decisions about enrolling in publicly funded health care may also 
be influenced by distrust of the government, which is in turn informed by anecdotal 
evidence, prior interactions with immigration authorities, or their experiences 
applying for public benefits. If a person is arrested by immigration authorities after 
receiving medical treatment or enrolling in Medicaid, noncitizens may infer that 
the person’s pursuit of health care triggered the arrest, even if there is no evidence 
of a connection. They may understand “medical deportations,” about which news 
stories appear periodically, as immigration enforcement actions, even though they 
are privately arranged by hospitals.190 Long-residing noncitizens may recall prior 
policies, some of which were ultimately struck down as unconstitutional, that 
 
to privacy protections in public benefits programs that could reasonably lead noncitizens to tread 
cautiously when considering whether to apply for public benefits. Without legal assistance to confirm 
that their information is not at risk of disclosure to immigration authorities, noncitizens may decline 
to apply. 
 188 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) § 642, 8 U.S.C. § 
1373(a) (2018) (referring to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), whose functions were 
largely assumed by USCIS, ICE, and CBP under the Homeland Security Act of 2002); PRWORA § 
434, 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2018). 
 189 See Mary Ann McNulty, Comment, A Doctrine Without Exception: Critiquing an 
Immigration Exception to the Anticommandeering Rule, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 243 (2020) 
(discussing the Second Circuit’s decision finding the provisions to be constitutional and not in 
violation of the anticommandeering doctrine, which diverged from the decisions of the Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits). These provisions have gained renewed attention in the context of a 
2017 federal regulation that threatened to withdraw federal police funding from jurisdictions that 
refused to certify compliance with them. 
 190 Medical deportations typically feature noncitizens who have been injured and are in need 
of long-term care but cannot be discharged from the hospital because they do not have health 
insurance. In such cases, some hospitals have arranged to transport patients to their countries of origin 
to avoid incurring additional costs. See Price, supra note 157, at 938 (describing the historical context 
for today’s fears of public charge, including the common early-twentieth-century practice of state 
mental health institution “engineering” the deportation of their noncitizen patients). 
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encouraged information-sharing between public benefits agencies and 
immigration authorities.191 
The immigration or public benefits application processes themselves can be 
sources of distrust. For example, the “Declaration of Self-Sufficiency,” the form 
used by LPR applicants to prove that they were not inadmissible under the 2019 
public charge regulations, requested information about current or past receipt of 
Medicaid even if such receipt was categorically excluded from consideration in the 
public charge analysis.192 The fact that USCIS requested information about any 
prior receipt of Medicaid, regardless of the circumstances or how long ago one was 
enrolled, only confirmed suspicions that any receipt of public benefits would be 
viewed unfavorably by immigration authorities. Similarly, although the Medicaid 
statute and ICE policy193 protect an applicant’s information from being used for 
immigration enforcement purposes, simply having to submit immigration 
documents to the public benefits agency for verification of immigration status can 
raise concerns about applying.194 HHS has acknowledged the potential chilling 
effect of requests for information about immigration status and SSNs on 
noncitizens’ health care access,195 and encourages state health and welfare officials 
to counter the effect by clarifying the laws relating to requests for such information 
 
 191 See PARK, supra note 1, at 43-45 (describing the chilling effects of a San Diego County 
policy that required the public benefits agency administering Medicaid to put up posters stating 
“[p]lease be aware that we can send any information you give us to [Immigration and Naturalization 
Service]”). 
 192 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 19, at 8; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR DECLARATION OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY 8-9 
(2019); see also Super, supra note 5, at 558 (describing how application forms for cancellation of 
removal and suspension of deportation, two highly discretionary forms of immigration relief, request 
information about the applicant’s and their family members’ receipt of public benefits even though 
“[t]he legal justification for these questions is unclear”). 
 193 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 166, at 1 (stating that “ICE does not use 
information . . . that is obtained for purposes of determining eligibility for [health] coverage as the 
basis for pursuing a civil immigration enforcement action . . . .”). 
 194 The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement (SAVE) system was established in 1986 
to enable public benefits agencies to obtain immigration status information about noncitizen 
applicants in order to determine eligibility. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 
Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 121, 100 Stat. 3359, 3384-94 (1986). Although DHS is prohibited from using 
any information submitted to SAVE for immigration enforcement activities, simply requesting 
immigration documents may chill some noncitizens and their family members from applying for 
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 note (Immigration and Naturalization Service to Establish Verification 
System by October 1, 1987) (stating that the system “shall not be used by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service for administrative (non-criminal) immigration enforcement purposes”). 
 195 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., POLICY GUIDANCE 
REGARDING INQUIRIES INTO CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION STATUS AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS IN 
STATE APPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID, STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP), 
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF), AND FOOD STAMP BENEFITS (2013), 
https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/special-topics/national-origin/tri-
agency/index.html. 
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and making certain changes to their application forms and processes.196 For 
example, HHS advises states to refrain from requiring applicants to provide 
citizenship or immigration status information about household members who are 
not applying for benefits, in line with Medicaid regulations. 197 Not all states have 
taken such practical steps to address chilling effects, which likely continues to 
discourage members of mixed-status families from applying for benefits for which 
they are eligible.198 
 
b. Immigration Sponsorship 
 
Noncitizens who have immigration sponsors are subject to immigration 
surveillance of their enrollment in Medicaid or CHIP in certain circumstances, 
which can deter them from applying for these programs. Specifically, public 
benefits agencies are required to share information about sponsored immigrants 
who receive federal means-tested public benefits and their sponsors with the 
Attorney General. In addition, if a public benefits agency obtains a final judgment 
against an immigration sponsor for reimbursement of the cost of benefits provided 
to a noncitizen, it may provide a copy of the judgment to USCIS.199 These modes 
of monitoring noncitizens’ involvement with the public benefits system are part of 
the web of immigration surveillance that generates health care system avoidance. 
The purpose of the immigration sponsor requirement for certain noncitizens 
is to ensure that they do not become a public charge. An immigration sponsor is a 
U.S. resident who assumes financial responsibility for a noncitizen, typically a 
family member, who intends to live in the United States permanently.200 Certain 
 
 196 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., POLICY GUIDANCE 
REGARDING INQUIRIES INTO CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION STATUS AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS IN 
STATE APPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID, STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP), 
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF), AND FOOD STAMP BENEFITS: QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS (2006), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/triagencyq%26as.pdf. 
 197 42 C.F.R. § 435.907(e)(1) (2021) (prohibiting states from requiring applicants to provide 
information that is not strictly necessary to make an eligibility determination); Medicaid Program; 
Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 17144, 17164 
(Mar. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 457) (stating that citizenship and 
immigration status information of household members who are not applying for benefits is not strictly 
necessary to make an eligibility determination). 
 198 See Super, supra note 5, at 560 (describing HHS Office of Civil Rights’ investigations in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s finding that states continued to improperly request information from 
non-applicant household members). Requests for any information about an undocumented or 
ineligible noncitizen household member may, unfortunately, deter some eligible people from 
applying for Medicaid. See id. at 561 (noting that the process of verifying a household member’s 
income could reveal their lack of immigration status). Such concerns are heightened in anti-
immigrant policy climates. Id. 
 199 See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.4(c)(1)-(2) (2021). 
 200 8 U.S.C. § 1183a; 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(b)-(c) (2021). Generally, sponsors must prove that they 
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LPR applicants are required to submit an “affidavit of support” from one or more 
sponsors as evidence that they will not become a public charge.201 When a 
sponsored immigrant applies for a public benefit, the agency is supposed to “deem” 
all of the sponsor’s income and resources to the sponsored immigrant when 
determining eligibility,202 often disqualifying the noncitizen from financial 
eligibility for the benefit regardless of how much support their sponsor is in fact 
providing.203 However, if the agency determines that a sponsored immigrant would 
“be unable to obtain food and shelter” if the benefit were not provided, considering 
the amount of support that the immigration sponsor is in fact providing, the agency 
may approve the application for benefits.204 This is known as the indigence 
exception to the sponsor deeming rule.205 An example of how it applies follows: A 
sponsored LPR is diagnosed with a chronic condition that is expensive to treat, like 
insulin-dependent Type II diabetes.206 He does not have health insurance and 
therefore applies for Medicaid. If the public benefits agency determines that his 
immigration sponsor does not provide him with adequate support such that he 
would become indigent if he had to pay for treatment, they may approve the 
application.207 In such cases, the agency must notify the Attorney General of the 
 
can support the sponsored immigrant at no less than 125% of the federal poverty line by providing 
evidence of sufficient income or assets. 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A); § 213a.2(c)(2). 
 201 § 213a.2(a)(2) (describing who is required to submit an affidavit of support). Affidavits of 
support are legally enforceable contracts binding the sponsor to provide financial support to the 
immigrant. § 1183a(a)(B); § 213a.2(c)(2)(C)(2), (d). Under the 2019 public charge rule, affidavits of 
support were not dispositive in the public charge determination but were considered as one factor in 
the “totality of circumstances” analysis. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 
41,292, 41,370 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 245, 248). Currently, 
LPR applicants can overcome public charge inadmissibility by submitting an affidavit of support 
alone, which was also the case prior to implementation of the 2019 rule. 
 202 8 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (2018). 
 203 Super, supra note 5, at 552 (noting that “deeming often will render the immigrant 
ineligible”). 
 204 § 1631(e). 
 205 Id. There are other exceptions to sponsor deeming, but public benefits agencies are not 
required to notify the Attorney General when they are applied. See, e.g., § 1631(b)(2) (providing an 
exception for noncitizens who have worked or can be credited with 40 qualifying quarters); § 1631(f) 
(providing an exception for survivors of domestic violence); Social Security Act of 1935 §§ 
1903(v)(4)(B), 2107(e)(1)(N), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(B),1397gg(e)(1)(N) (2018) (providing an 
exception for children 21 years of age or pregnant women); Letter from Calder Lynch, Acting Deputy 
Adm’r & Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Health Officials 2-3 (Aug. 23, 2019), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/sho19004.pdf (providing an 
exception for applicants for emergency Medicaid). 
 206 Medication and supplies can cost up to $1,300 per month. See Insulin Prices: How Much 
Does Insulin Cost?, SINGLECARE (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.singlecare.com/blog/insulin-prices/. 
 207 This assumes that the LPR is eligible for Medicaid in their state of residence. Medicaid 
eligibility varies substantially across states, but in most states, LPRs who have held that status for 
five years or more qualify for Medicaid so long as they meet the other eligibility criteria. See 
Makhlouf, supra note 165, at 1706-09. 
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names of the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant.208 
Receipt of public benefits by a sponsored immigrant may lead to another 
situation in which a public benefits agency shares information about sponsored 
immigrants and their sponsors with immigration authorities. When a noncitizen 
qualifies for public benefits — whether eligibility is based on the indigence 
exception or not209 — their sponsor is generally liable to the government for the 
cost of the benefit provided.210 If a public benefits agency pursues legal action 
against an immigration sponsor for reimbursement of the costs of the benefits 
provided to a sponsored immigrant211 and obtains a favorable judgment, it must 
share a copy of the judgment with USCIS to inform the agency that the 
immigration sponsor has not met their obligations under the affidavit of support.212 
These notification provisions may deter some sponsored immigrants from 
applying for Medicaid or CHIP because of concerns about the impact on future 
immigration applications. Specifically, they may believe that any use of public 
benefits will negatively affect their own ability or their sponsor’s ability to sponsor 
others.213 When a noncitizen’s immigration sponsor is a family member who plans 
to sponsor other family members in the future, as is often the case, enrolling in 
public benefits is perceived as a risk to family reunification.214 
Such beliefs have long influenced noncitizens’ decisions to apply for public 
benefits,215 but they were validated and heightened during the Trump 
Administration. For example, chilling effects of the notification provisions were 
observed during prior administrations, even though immigration authorities at the 
time indicated that ICE used information obtained from the Attorney General only 
for “compiling statistical reports.”216 Such concerns were heightened during the 
Trump Administration because it stepped up enforcement of affidavits of support, 
 
 208 § 1631(e)(2); see PARK, supra note 1, at 45 (describing how state agencies were not 
permitted to share information with immigration authorities prior to 1996). 
 209 State methodologies for counting immigration sponsors’ income and resources vary. See 
Letter from Calder Lynch, supra note 205, at 4. 
 210 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) (2021). But see §§ 1396b(v)(4)(B), 
1397gg(e)(1)(N) (prohibiting states from seeking reimbursement for the costs of Medicaid and/or 
CHIP provided to lawfully present children and pregnant women). 
 211 State policies vary in terms of whether to pursue reimbursement from sponsors. See § 
1183a(b); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.4(a)(1) (2021) (describing agencies’ discretion to seek reimbursement). 
 212 § 213a.4(c)(1)-(2). 
 213 See Super, supra note 5, at 554. 
 214 See TIM O’SHEA & CRISTOBAL RAMÓN, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., IMMIGRANTS AND PUBLIC 
BENEFITS: WHAT DOES THE RESEARCH SAY? 10 (2018) (“[S]ome immigrants reduced their use of 
Medicaid to protect their ability to sponsor family members for immigration, which requires 
individuals to show an ability to financially support themselves and their family members.”). 
 215 See, e.g., Super, supra note 5, at 553 (describing immigration sponsors’ reasons for 
discouraging sponsored immigrants from applying for public benefits). 
 216 Id. (noting the “profound” chilling effects of the notification requirement during the Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama Administrations). 
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including directing public benefits agencies to seek reimbursement for every dollar 
of public benefits provided to sponsored immigrants,217 which is traditionally and 
legally a matter of state discretion.218 It also proposed rules that would streamline 
information sharing between public benefits agencies and immigration 
authorities219 and prevent immigration sponsors who had defaulted on their 
obligations in the past from serving in this role again.220 The belief that one’s own 
use of public benefits could jeopardize one’s ability to serve as an immigration 
sponsor was often endorsed by immigration lawyers, despite the fact that DHS’s 
policy under prior administrations was to not consider public benefits use by 
petitioning immigration sponsors when determining their ability to serve in the 
role.221 The Trump Administration validated these concerns when it proposed a 
rule seeking to penalize petitioning immigration sponsors who had used public 
benefits, including Medicaid or CHIP, within the thirty-six-month period prior to 
filing an affidavit of support.222 Although the Biden Administration has revoked 
 
 217 See Memorandum from Andrew Bremberg on Executive Order on Protecting Taxpayer 
Resources by Ensuring Our Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and Responsibility to Donald 
J. Trump, President of the U.S. §§ 2(c), 3(a)(iv), 3(i)(i) (Jan. 23, 2017) (instructing public benefits 
agencies and the Department of Justice to prioritize sponsor reimbursement); Press Release, Ken 
Cuccinelli II, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Presidential Memorandum on 
Enforcing the Legal Responsibilities of Sponsors of Aliens (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/presidential-memorandum-on-enforcing-the-legal-
responsibilities-of-sponsors-of-aliens (directing USCIS officers “to remind individuals at their 
adjustment of status interviews of their sponsors’ responsibilities”); Memorandum from Donald J. 
Trump, President of the U.S., on Enforcing the Legal Responsibilities of Sponsors of Aliens § 1 (May 
23, 2019); see also Letter from Calder Lynch, supra note 205, at 4 (providing guidance to state 
officials administering Medicaid and CHIP on how to comply with the Presidential Memorandum on 
Enforcing the Legal Responsibilities of Sponsors of Aliens). 
 218 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 213a.4(a)(1) (2021); see also O’SHEA & RAMÓN, 
supra note 214, at 5 (indicating that some states have chosen not to seek repayment from sponsors at 
all); ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33809, NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE: POLICY OVERVIEW 14-15 n.40 (2016) (“Despite the mandatory nature of the statutory 
language, Congress may lack constitutional authority to compel states to request reimbursement of 
state funds from sponsors, and the statute itself recognizes that the states have discretion on whether 
to follow up requests with further legal action.”). 
 219 Affidavit of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 85 Fed. Reg. 62,432, 62,447 (Oct. 2, 2020) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 213a) (eliminating the requirement that public benefits agencies must 
subpoena USCIS to get a copy of an Affidavit of Support for purposes of enforcing sponsor 
reimbursement and revising the reporting procedure for reasons of efficiency). 
 220 Id. at 62,443 (describing a new requirement of a joint sponsor when the petitioning sponsor 
has been ordered to reimburse a public benefits agency for the cost of benefits provided to a 
noncitizen in the past). 
 221 See Super, supra note 5, at 554 (noting that this policy applied during the Clinton, Bush, 
and Obama Administrations); see also Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 71 Fed. Reg. 
35,732, 35,738 (June 21, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205, 213a, 299 (noting that any 
public benefits received are not considered as part of sponsor’s income for purposes of meeting the 
income threshold, but not indicating that they are held against the petitioning sponsor in any way). 
 222 Affidavit of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 85 Fed. Reg. at 62442 (noting that DHS 
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the Trump-era Presidential Memorandum that triggered heightened enforcement 
of sponsors’ obligations,223 surveillance of public benefits use by sponsored 
immigrants and their immigration sponsors is still required under law, and the 
proposed rules intensifying such surveillance remain pending. 
 
c. Fraud Investigations 
 
Privacy protections in Medicaid, CHIP, and the ACA Marketplace do not 
apply when an applicant is suspected of committing health care fraud or abuse 
because enforcement actions relating to benefits fraud and abuse are considered a 
purpose directly connected with the administration of benefits programs.224 State 
Medicaid agencies are required to investigate complaints of Medicaid fraud or 
abuse by beneficiaries and refer such cases to law enforcement if fraud is 
suspected.225 The definition of fraud “includes any act that constitutes fraud under 
applicable Federal or State law” and generally refers to the use of deceit or 
misrepresentation to receive a benefit for which one does not qualify.226 
Beneficiary abuse is defined as “practices that result in unnecessary cost to the 
Medicaid program.”227 The Office of Inspector General of HHS works with the 
Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute health care fraud and abuse in 
all publicly funded health insurance programs.228 Fraud investigation units of state 
Medicaid agencies perform a similar function in conjunction with the state attorney 
general’s office. 
The precise process by which immigration authorities receive information 
about noncitizens who are investigated or prosecuted for health care fraud or abuse 
is not always clear,229 but it is certain that ICE acts on such information to initiate 
 
considered “permanently barring” those who had ever received public benefits from becoming a 
sponsor but settled for a presumption that a petitioning sponsor who has received public benefits 
“may not have the ability to meet the support obligations while the Affidavit is in effect”). 
 223 Exec. Order No. 14012, Restoring Faith in Our Legal Immigration Systems and 
Strengthening Integration and Inclusion Efforts for New Americans § 6, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,277 (Feb. 2, 
2021). 
 224 42 C.F.R. § 431.302 (2021) (describing the exception in Medicaid); Id. § 457.1110(b) 
(describing the exception in CHIP). 
 225 The governing regulations describe methods for the identification, investigation, and 
referral of suspected Medicaid fraud. Id. § 455.13. Agencies are required to investigate complaints 
of Medicaid fraud received from any source. Id. § 455.14. They must refer cases of suspected fraud 
by beneficiaries “to an appropriate law enforcement agency.” Id. § 455.15(b). 
 226 Id. § 455.2. 
 227 Id. 
 228 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7c, 1395i(k) (2018) (establishing and funding the fraud and abuse 
control program). 
 229 See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., UNTANGLING THE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WEB 1-2 
(2017), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Untangling-Immigration-Enforcement-
Web-2017-09.pdf (discussing the difficulty of describing all of the ways in which information is 
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removal proceedings. The ICE website contains several press releases describing 
immigration enforcement actions initiated because of health care fraud.230 For 
example, one press release describes the arrest of a Jamaican citizen and New York 
resident who used another person’s SSN to qualify for Medicaid.231 Another 
describes how an investigation by ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations unit 
led to the conviction of an undocumented noncitizen for Medicaid and SNAP fraud 
after she failed to accurately report her husband’s income; she was likely deported 
after serving her prison sentence and, if so, may not be able to enter the United 
States ever again.232 
The fraud exception may deter noncitizens from applying for publicly funded 
health insurance because of a fear that an innocent error or misunderstanding could 
have negative immigration consequences. As illustrated in the examples described 
in the previous paragraph, a conviction for health care fraud can be the basis for a 
finding of deportability. It can also render a noncitizen inadmissible under 
immigration law, meaning that they can be denied entry to the United States in the 
future or that their application for LPR status will be denied.233 Any finding of 
health care fraud in a noncitizens’ record may be considered a negative factor in 
future immigration applications in which a favorable exercise of discretion is 
required.234 
Such fears are not unfounded, given the punitive immigration policies 
 
shared between immigration and law enforcement agencies because of a lack of transparency); 
Kalhan, supra note 10, at 76 (“[I]mmigration agencies . . . have long suffered from major 
transparency and accountability deficits . . . . No framework statutes govern or constrain immigration 
surveillance activities, which . . . also fall outside of the limited privacy protections available under 
the Privacy Act.”). 
 230 See News Releases, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/newsroom
?field_news_release_topics_tag_target_id=165&field_field_location_administrative_area=All&fiel
d_published_date_value%5Bmin%5D=&field_published_date_value%5Bmax%5D=&combine=m
edicaid&field_field_location_country_code=All (last visited July 16, 2021). 
 231 HSI Arrests Jamaican Woman on Medicaid Fraud Charges, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T (Aug. 23, 2013), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/hsi-arrests-jamaican-woman-medicaid-
fraud-charges. 
 232 See Report and Recommendation at 5, United States v. Puac-Gomez, No. 18-cr-3044-CJW 
(N.D. Iowa Feb. 7, 2019), ECF No. 31, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-iand-
3_18-cr-03044/pdf/USCOURTS-iand-3_18-cr-03044-0.pdf. Although it is not clear from the facts 
publicly available, since Ms. Puac-Gomez was not charged with identity theft or falsely claiming to 
be a U.S. citizen — and would not be eligible for Medicaid or SNAP based on her immigration status 
— it is likely that she had applied for benefits on behalf of eligible members of her household, 
possibly U.S.-citizen children. 
 233 INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii); see also Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
41,305 (discussing how false claims to U.S. citizenship in public benefits applications can result in a 
finding of inadmissibility). 
 234 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,305; see also Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that a fraud conviction is unequivocally considered a 
“crime involving moral turpitude”). 
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embraced by the Trump Administration and, before that, similar rhetoric by other 
politicians as well as prior instances of cooperation between public benefits and 
immigration agencies. A priority of the Trump Administration was to target the 
“abuse” of the public benefits system by noncitizens.235 DHS, during this period, 
stepped up its investigations of naturalization fraud, employing a broad definition 
of fraud to engage in unprecedented efforts to denaturalize U.S. citizens on that 
basis.236 Simultaneously, it began implementing a shadow policy of rejecting 
immigration applications for clerical oversights, such as leaving a response blank 
instead of writing “N/A” when a question does not apply to an applicant or typing 
an applicant’s name when it was supposed to have been handwritten.237 This 
contributed to a policy climate of intense scrutiny and suspicion of noncitizens in 
their applications for immigration and public benefits. However, such policies did 
not originate with the Trump Administration. In a 2006 congressional hearing 
titled “Examining the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Medicaid Program and 
Our Healthcare Delivery System,” for example, witnesses favoring stricter 
verification requirements of citizenship and immigration status in Medicaid 
testified about the “large and growing” problem of public benefits being provided 
to undocumented noncitizens.238 A particularly egregious example of cooperation 
between immigration and public benefits agencies, purportedly to root out 
Medicaid fraud, occurred in California in the 1990s: the Port of Entry Detection 
(PED) program.239 Immigration agents at the Los Angeles and San Francisco 
airports asked noncitizens returning to the United States whether they had 
 
 235 See, e.g., White House, President Donald J. Trump is Ensuring Non-Citizens Do Not Abuse 
Our Nation’s Public Benefit (Aug. 12, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-ensuring-non-citizens-not-abuse-nations-public-
benefit/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wh. 
 236 See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, (Un)civil Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 402 (2019). 
 237 See, e.g., Maddy Garber, Rejections of Correctly Filed Immigration Applications Are 
Senseless and Heartless, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://immigrantjustice.org/
staff/blog/rejections-correctly-filed-immigration-applications-are-senseless-and-heartless. 
 238 Examining the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Medicaid Program and Our Healthcare 
Delivery System: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement 
of Rep. Marsha Blackburn, Member, H. Comm. on Energy & Com.). Some of the testimony 
characterizing the extent of the problem suffered from logical fallacies. For example, Abel C. Ortiz, 
a state policy advisor from Georgia, improperly presumed that a reduction in the Medicaid caseload 
after the implementation of stricter document verification rules was “strong evidence of fraud and 
abuse inherent” under the previous system, failing to acknowledge that the stricter rules could also 
pose access barriers to eligible applicants. Id. at 120 (statement of Abel C. Ortiz, Health & Hum. 
Servs. Pol’y Advisor, Off. of the Gov., State of Ga.). Dr. Marty Michaels, Chair of the Georgia 
Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, made this point in his testimony, describing how 
the new rules denied access to Medicaid to low-income U.S. citizen children who did not have the 
required paperwork. Id. at 159-60 (statement of Dr. Marty Michaels, Chair, Ga. Ch., Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics). 
 239 See PARK, supra note 1, at 59-65. 
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previously used Medicaid.240 If they had, they were advised to voluntarily 
reimburse the state public benefits agency for the cost of the benefits provided in 
order to avoid future immigration-related problems.241 The program targeted 
women — disproportionately Latinas and Asians — who had legally received 
Medicaid coverage for pregnancy-related care, who were not suspected of fraud, 
and who were not subject to a public charge determination.242 The PED program 
was suspended after a class action lawsuit resulted in a settlement.243 Still, 
noncitizens received a clear message: “using [Medicaid] can be detrimental to your 
immigration status.”244 
III. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM HARMS 
This Part explains the health-related tradeoffs of permitting immigration 
surveillance in health care.245 It does not purport to be a precise cost-benefit 
analysis of immigration surveillance in health care; rather, it is intended to 
contribute to analyses of the unintended consequences of the decades-long 
expansion of interior immigration enforcement.246 When immigration policy fails 
to consider its health-related consequences, it incompletely assesses the risks of 
certain policy choices.247 It appears to assume that any purported immigration 
enforcement gains outweigh the costs to public health, the health care system, and 
 
 240 Id. at 60. 
 241 Id. at 62. 
 242 Id. at 60-61, 63, 68-69. 
 243 Id. at 63. 
 244 Id. at 73. 
 245 This analysis is inspired by the Health in All Policies framework, which aims to 
“integrate[e] considerations of health, well-being, and equity during the development, 
implementation, and evaluation” of laws and policies across sectors. Dawn Pepin et al., 
Collaborating for Health: Health in All Policies and the Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 60 (2017); see 
also Taylor, supra note 41, at 9 (“Many laws and policies have health effects even when, at first 
glance, the laws and policies do not seem to be directly related to health outcomes.”). Studies have 
established that immigration enforcement directly impacts the health of noncitizens, including by 
causing psychological damage, raising cardiovascular risk factors, and reducing birth weight. See 
Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 329; Saadi & McKee, supra note 64, at k2178; Taylor, supra note 
41, at 3; cf. Taylor, id. at 6 (“Research has linked positive health outcomes to protective immigration 
laws and policies in the US.”). Although these are important health-related harms of immigration 
policy, this Part focuses on the specific harms of health care system avoidance motivated by 
immigration surveillance in health care. 
 246 See, e.g., Cade, supra note 90, at 500 (noting health-related consequences of “[i]mmigration 
crackdowns and equity-blind enforcement”); Jain, supra note 11, at 1510 (“Immigration enforcement 
decisions should take into account the long-term public health consequences of trauma or stress 
relating to enforcement.”). 
 247 See Jain, supra note 11, at 1466 (noting that “policymakers have failed to appreciate the 
hidden costs” of heightened interior immigration enforcement); Taylor, supra note 41, at 9 (urging 
academics to “assess the nonobvious health consequences of laws and policies as a way of better 
understanding the consequences of the law and public policy on human health . . . “). 
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health care providers.248 
Permitting immigration surveillance in health care (or not countering 
perceptions that it occurs) involves making tradeoffs between immigration and 
health policy goals.249 The main benefit of immigration surveillance in health care 
is to expand potential opportunities to enforce immigration laws against 
undocumented noncitizens and noncitizens who are unable to demonstrate “self-
sufficiency.” But it is also likely to generate health care system avoidance and 
therefore have negative consequences for health and health care.250 The benefits of 
immigration surveillance in health care are mostly symbolic, reinforcing the 
climate of fear for noncitizens, while the costs — as this Part shows — are 
measurable and far reaching. 
A. Heightened Public Health Risks 
When people avoid or delay seeking health care based on fears of 
immigration-related consequences, they increase the risk of spreading infectious 
disease. This is, of course, a major concern in the era of COVID-19.251 DHS was 
permitted to begin implementing its new public charge rule just as people in the 
United States began to die from COVID-19.252 Predictably, the 2019 rule has 
deterred noncitizens from accessing testing, treatment, and vaccination for 
 
 248 See Castañeda, supra note 37, at 55 (“The political logic of utilizing access to affordable 
health care as a tool of immigration policy is faulty . . . .”). 
 249 See Frost, supra note 22, at 98 (“The federal government has always balanced immigration 
enforcement against other goals and values . . . .”); Jawetz & Chung, supra note 68 (describing how 
DHS typically issues statements during national disasters limiting immigration enforcement because 
“its ‘highest priorities . . . are to promote life-saving and life-sustaining activities.’” (quoting Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., DHS Statement Regarding Safety and Enforcement During 
Hurricane Irma (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/06/dhs-statement-regarding-
safety-and-enforcement-during-hurricane-irma)); Kalhan supra note 10, at 73 (“[B]oth individuals 
and society as a whole have legitimate interests in preserving zones in which . . . immigration 
surveillance activities do not take place and in making sure that when they do take place those 
activities are appropriately limited and constrained.”). 
 250 See Brayne, supra note 4, at 385 (“‘[E]fforts to evade the gaze of different systems involves 
an attendant trade-off.’ That trade-off is full participation in society.” (quoting KEVIN D. HAGGERTY 
& RICHARD V. ERICSON, THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 619 (2006))). 
 251 See, e.g., Makhlouf & Sandhu, supra note 177, at 159-62 (describing how the 2019 public 
charge rule discourages noncitizens from accessing health care for treatment of COVID-19 
symptoms and public benefits that would enable them to better comply with social distancing 
recommendations); Achieving a Fair and Effective COVID-19 Response: An Open Letter to Vice-
President Mike Pence, and Other Federal, State and Local Leaders from Public Health and Legal 
Experts in the United States 2 (Mar. 2, 2020), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files
/area/center/ghjp/documents/final_covid19_letter_from_public_health_and_legal_experts.pdf 
(recommending that “[t]he COVID-19 response should not be linked to immigration enforcement in 
any manner.”). 
 252 Makhlouf & Sandhu, supra note 177, at 166. 
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COVID-19.253 
However, the threat that immigration-related health care system avoidance 
poses to the public’s health transcends the current pandemic.254 For example, if 
noncitizen parents avoid taking their children to the doctor for well-child 
appointments (or applying for health coverage that will enable them to attend those 
appointments), they may contribute to the loss of herd immunity for vaccine-
preventable diseases, such as measles. Herd immunity provides some protection to 
members of the community who are unable to be vaccinated, because the spread 
of infectious disease is contained when a critical mass of the population is 
vaccinated. The health risks of losing herd immunity are borne primarily by infants 
who are too young to be vaccinated and people with compromised immune 
systems due to cancer treatment or other causes. 
Even though the 2019 rule has been rescinded, it is likely to chill noncitizen 
access to health care for the long term.255 The public health impact of chilling 
noncitizens’ access to health care is a key rationale for protecting noncitizens from 
surveillance while accessing health care or coverage.256 It is one of the “hidden 
costs” to larger society of expanding interior immigration enforcement to health 
care sites.257 Immigration authorities have historically adopted this rationale for 
 
 253 Lee et al., supra note 15, at 1-2; Flores et al., supra note 66; Raúl Grijalva et al., An 
Equitable Distribution of COVID-19 Vaccine Must Include Noncitizens, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2021), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/535901-an-equitable-distribution-of-covid-19-
vaccine-must-include (explaining the importance of federal leadership to assure noncitizens that 
“vaccine recipients’ information will not be shared with immigration agencies for enforcement 
purposes or to jeopardize future immigration applications under the public charge regulations”); 
Shoichet, supra note 8. 
 254 This is not to say that fears of contagion by noncitizens should be the primary motivation 
for limiting immigration surveillance in health care. Indeed, ethnic contagion is an antiquated trope 
that has justified flagrant violations of liberty against noncitizens in the past. For example, fears of 
bubonic plague in San Francisco in 1900 were the basis of public health orders that forcibly 
inoculated residents of Asian descent with an experimental vaccine and imposed an unjustified 
quarantine of Chinatown. See, e.g., Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900); Jew 
Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 26 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Anti-Asian 
hate crimes have surged in the United States, presumably because of the virus’ origin in China. See, 
e.g., Jaweed Kaleem et al., Anti-Asian Hate Crimes and Harassment Rise to Historic Levels during 
COVID-19 Pandemic, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2021-03-05/anti-asian-crimes-harassment. 
 255 See, e.g., GUERRERO ET AL., supra note 182, at 4, 6, 12. 
 256 See Cleek, supra note 88, at 1000; Saadi & McKee, supra note 64, at k2178. 
 257 Jain, supra note 11, at 1491-92 (explaining that some of the costs of interior immigration 
enforcement are “structural” and “not unique to immigration”). Undocumented noncitizens are an 
important component of the U.S. essential workforce, especially in the fields of agriculture, housing 
and facilities, food services and production, transportation, and health. See, e.g., FWD.US, 
IMMIGRANT ESSENTIAL WORKERS ARE CRUCIAL TO AMERICA’S COVID-19 RECOVERY 8-9 (2020), 
https://www.fwd.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FWD-essential-worker-report-FINAL-WEB.pdf. 
Therefore, barriers to care for this population should be considered a threat to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure. 
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announcing the suspension of immigration enforcement at or near health care sites 
during national disasters and other public health emergencies.258 
Immigration surveillance in health care is just one of many access barriers that 
create heightened public health risks among noncitizens,259 but it is one for which 
there is a clear remedy. It is a reasonable, logical next step for policymakers to 
recognize immigration surveillance in health care as a perennial threat to public 
health. 
B. Inefficient Use of Health Care Resources 
When immigration concerns cause people to delay or avoid seeking health 
care or coverage (a means to obtaining health care), it is harder for health care 
providers to generate good health outcomes and thereby reduces cost-effectiveness 
in the health care system.260 Annual check-ups for older children and adults are an 
important way to identify emerging health issues. For younger children, more 
frequent well-child visits are critical for detecting growth or developmental issues 
and getting vaccines. It is particularly important for patients who have been 
diagnosed with chronic disease to see their health care provider regularly to ensure 
that the disease is appropriately managed.261 When health issues are not identified 
early, treatment begins later — sometimes when a disease is at a more advanced 
stage.262 When chronic diseases are poorly managed, the risks of becoming 
 
 258 Flores et al., supra note 66. 
 259 Additional social determinants of health that increase noncitizens’ risk of exposure to and 
negative outcomes from COVID-19 include reliance on underfunded health care providers with 
limited ability to manage patients’ care due to lack of insurance, higher incidence of underlying health 
conditions linked to severe COVID-19 symptoms, “excessive stress related to poverty, trauma, and 
poor social support,” the need to continue working jobs in which social distancing is not possible, 
reliance on public transportation, living in multigenerational households or with roommates, limited 
English proficiency, and limited access to cell phones or the internet. Eva Clark et al., 
Disproportionate Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Immigrant Communities in the United 
States, PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, July 13, 2020, at 2-3. 
 260 Cost-effectiveness or “better value” is a goal of U.S. health care policy. See Gustavo Mery 
et al., What Do We Mean When We Talk About the Triple Aim? A Systematic Review of Evolving 
Definitions and Adaptations of the Framework at the Health System Level, 121 HEALTH POL’Y 629, 
633 (2017) (explaining that the Triple Aim, an organizing framework for U.S. health care system 
reform, can be understood as a proxy for cost-effectiveness). 
 261 See Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 329 (noting that delayed treatment by noncitizens who 
fear immigration enforcement can “lead to incomplete sequences of care [and] promote the use of 
nonstandard and unsafe contingencies for care”). 
 262 See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 44, at 126 (“[I]ncreasingly, chronic, long-term conditions are 
not naturally occurring ones, but are those for which the political will and economic resources are 
simply not brought to bear for a given community.” (quoting Lenore Manderson & Carolyn Smith-
Morris, Introduction, in CHRONIC CONDITIONS, FLUID STATES: CHRONICITY AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF ILLNESS 18 (Lenore Manderson & Carolyn Smith-Morris eds., 2010))); Arijit Nandi, Sana Loue 
& Sandro Galea, Expanding the Universe of Universal Coverage: The Population Health Argument 
for Increasing Coverage for Immigrants, 11 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 433, 435 (2009) 
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seriously ill or dying increase.263 In both cases, delayed treatment is cost-
ineffective and may also be less effective clinically.264 One example of this is late 
or inadequate uptake of prenatal care, which can result in pregnancy complications 
that lead to extremely costly postnatal and pediatric care.265 
Delayed treatment is a source of inefficiency in the health care system in 
several ways.266 First, it can contribute to driving up insurance-related costs for all. 
When noncitizens are deterred from accessing routine health care and only seek 
care when health issues become more complex or emergent, the treatment can be 
costlier. Consider, for example, an insulin-dependent diabetic patient who skips a 
doctor’s appointment and is later admitted to the hospital with severe 
hypoglycemia — a situation that could have been avoided with routine case 
management. This more expensive care translates to higher costs for insurers, 
including public health insurance programs, if the noncitizen has or later qualifies 
for coverage. This could drive up insurance premiums in the private market and 
the costs of taxpayer-funded public health insurance. Second, when noncitizens 
decline to enroll in public health insurance programs for which they are eligible 
and are ultimately unable to pay for health care costs out-of-pocket, it can increase 
uncompensated care costs for hospitals and physician’ offices — especially 
hospitals that are obligated to provide treatment to stabilize patients in 
emergencies.267 Third, immigration-related health care system avoidance causes 
inefficiency for physician practices. Every “no-show” appointment wastes 
providers’ time and represents a loss of potential reimbursement. Also, poor patient 
 
(noting the higher likelihood of the undocumented population to delay seeking care and, when they 
do, to have preexisting disease); Saadi & McKee, supra note 64, at 1 (“[P]eople with preventable or 
chronic conditions risk delays that may worsen their condition and increase visits to emergency 
departments.”). 
 263 See Hacker et al., supra note 2, at 180 (describing the health consequences of the well-
known fact that noncitizens underutilize health care services); Hacker et al., supra note 43, at 661 
(noting patients with immigration concerns are often harder “to contact . . . to [e]nsure that 
recommendations on health conditions are met, leading to exacerbation of chronic conditions such 
as diabetes and hypertension.”). 
 264 Kullgren, supra note 51, at 1632 (noting that policies that cause noncitizens to delay seeking 
health care for conditions until they are emergent “prevents administrators from putting public 
resources to their most cost-effective use”); Nandi et al., supra note 263, at 435 (describing how 
delayed care-seeking by patients with diabetes and asthma can lead to unnecessary complications). 
 265 Lawrence O. Gostin, Is Affording Undocumented Immigrants Health Coverage a Radical 
Proposal?, 322 JAMA 1438, 1438 (2019). 
 266 Delayed treatment increases societal and economic costs in other ways as well, such as by 
increasing school absenteeism and parental work absence, but this discussion is limited to cost-
effectiveness within the health care system. Lee et al., supra note 15, at 6. 
 267 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-472, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: QUESTIONS 
PERSIST ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON HOSPITALS’ UNCOMPENSATED CARE COSTS 12 (2004), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242452.pdf (describing reports from state Medicaid officials and 
hospital association members that “fear of being discovered by immigration authorities is one factor 
that can deter undocumented aliens from enrolling” in emergency Medicaid). 
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health outcomes caused by interrupted case management can reduce the practice’s 
reimbursement in value-based payment programs. 
C. Interference with Professional Ethical Duties 
Permitting immigration surveillance in health care creates ethical dilemmas 
for health care providers. Providers cannot act with single-minded devotion to the 
well-being of patients when patients’ engagement with the health care system may 
have negative immigration consequences. As a result, providers are sometimes 
forced to alter clinical risk calculations and clinical recommendations for reasons 
relating to immigration enforcement. In addition, laws and policies that make 
health care providers complicit with immigration enforcement — or create the 
perception of complicity — negatively impact the provider-patient relationship. 
Immigration surveillance in health care limits health care providers’ ability to 
care for noncitizen patients based on their best clinical judgment.268 When they 
cannot guarantee that accessing health care or coverage will not lead to negative 
immigration consequences for noncitizen patients,269 patients may withdraw from 
their care and perhaps seek alternative sources of care.270 Patients who remain may 
trust their provider less.271 After the 2016 election, health care providers reported 
having to alter their clinical risk calculations and recommendations: They 
discounted biological risks in order to account for “the social risks of detention, 
deportation, and family separation” in the new immigration policy climate.272 
Providers may feel compelled to consider the potential immigration consequences 
of a noncitizen patient enrolling in public health insurance in order to access health 
care against the risks of having an untreated medical condition.273 Others may feel 
compelled, for financial reasons, to “push” patients to enroll in Medicaid so that 
they can be reimbursed for services provided, regardless of the potential impact on 
a patient’s future immigration options.274 Simply having to do this type of 
 
 268 See PARK, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
 269 Id. (describing how the 1996 federal immigration law left health care providers “limited in 
what they can say or do for their patients”); Hardy et al., supra note 31, at 1250 (discussing the 
difficulty health care providers have with understanding their obligations under SB 1070, a 2010 
Arizona law enhancing immigration policing); Licon, supra note 63 (quoting Dr. Elisabeth Poorman, 
“The ground is constantly shifting. I can tell the patient I am committed to your safety, but in the 
[Trump] administration we cannot tell everyone that they are 100% safe”). 
 270 PARK, supra note 1, at 133 (describing how some noncitizens in San Diego who feel unsafe 
accessing health care self-diagnose, visit alternative healers, or obtain care and medicine from 
pharmacies in Mexico). 
 271 Id. at 95. 
 272 Van Natta, supra note 21, at 1; see also KLINE, supra note 44, at 124 (describing one doctor’s 
consideration of patients’ immigration status when making recommendations for follow-up care). 
 273 Van Natta, supra note 21, at 3. 
 274 See PARK, supra note 1, at 94. 
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calculation makes some providers feel complicit with immigration enforcement 
and contributes to provider burnout.275 
When immigration laws and policies require health care providers to 
cooperate with immigration authorities, it can damage provider-patient 
relationships and arguably constitutes an unjustified interference with their 
practice. Health care providers may be asked to verify a patient’s identity or 
immigration status (or lack thereof).276 They may be asked by immigration 
enforcement officers to perform examinations of detainees who are suspected of 
carrying drugs.277 Whether they choose to cooperate or not, it puts providers in a 
difficult situation. Members of the health care profession have an ethical obligation 
to “act for the good of all of their patients, irrespective of their category 
memberships.”278 This ethical principle, which originates in the Hippocratic Oath, 
is often restated as “do no harm.”279 The focus of the provider-patient relationship 
is healing. Actual or perceived complicity with immigration enforcement interferes 
with this goal, as well as with providers’ broad ethical obligation to protect patient 
privacy.280 
D. Violation of Health Equity Norms 
Policies permitting immigration surveillance in health care primarily affect 
noncitizens, compounding disadvantage, particularly for undocumented people 
 
 275 Van Natta, supra note 21, at 5-6. Patients’ fears of immigration surveillance in health care 
can also leave providers feeling helpless in the face of their patients’ suffering, which can be 
frustrating and distressing. PARK, supra note 1, at 135 (describing a health care provider’s reactions 
to treating a patient with uterine cancer who needed a hysterectomy but repeatedly declined because 
of a fear of deportation). 
 276 See KLINE, supra note 44, at 117-18 (describing providers outrage over Georgia’s HB 87, 
which limited providers’ ability to provide care to undocumented people); PARK, supra note 1, at 123 
(describing a case in which a CBP officer called a San Diego prenatal health clinic from a U.S.-
Mexico border crossing to ask if a patient was indeed a U.S. citizen). 
 277 See, e.g., Melissa del Bosque, Checkpoint Nation, TEX. OBSERVER (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.texasobserver.org/checkpoint-nation/ (describing evidence that health care providers 
routinely cooperate with CBP to perform warrantless and consent-less body cavity searches and 
medical imaging of detainees, and how providers may feel compelled to comply with CBP officers 
requesting such procedures). 
 278 Jeff Sconyers & Tyler Tate, How Should Clinicians Treat Patients Who Might Be 
Undocumented?, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 229, 233 (2016). 
 279 See Song, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that the phrase itself is not contained in the original 
Hippocratic Oath); Robert H. Shmerling, The Myth of the Hippocratic Oath, HARV. HEALTH BLOG 
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/the-myth-of-the-hippocratic-oath-2015112
58447 (noting that the original Hippocratic Oath includes a promise to avoid harming patients). 
 280 See Song, supra note 6, at 59 (discussing the expansive concept of privacy in the medical 
context, including the obligation “to protect patient privacy in all settings to the greatest extent 
possible” (quoting Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/privacy-health-care)). 
HEALTH CARE SANCTUARIES 
55 
and their family members.281 Noncitizens are considered a disadvantaged, 
stigmatized, and vulnerable population in the health care sphere.282 When people 
delay or avoid seeking health care because of concerns about immigration 
surveillance, their risk of suffering or dying from treatable and preventable 
conditions increases. 
Such policies exacerbate racial and ethnic health and health care disparities, 
violating health equity norms in U.S. health policy.283 Surveillance efforts in health 
care settings that are focused on undocumented noncitizens may result in 
discrimination against noncitizens generally and the Latinx population in 
particular, and the misapplication of enforcement-related policies to these 
groups.284 Since immigration authorities know that undocumented noncitizens are 
typically limited to accessing health care at community health centers and hospital 
emergency rooms, they may focus surveillance efforts there. Such locations are 
also disproportionately likely to serve low-income people, lawfully present 
noncitizens, and communities of color; therefore, policies permitting immigration 
surveillance in health care contribute to the racial and class-based stratification of 
the health care system.285 
IV. LEGITIMACY HARMS 
This Part describes three ways in which the state compromises its legitimacy 
through laws and policies permitting immigration surveillance in health care. First, 
these laws and policies impose severe and burdensome constraints on noncitizens’ 
ability to understand how and when they may access publicly funded health care 
without incurring negative immigration consequences. Second, they require 
applicants for immigration benefits to waive the confidentiality rights conferred by 
the statutes governing publicly funded health care programs. Third, they 
undermine noncitizens’ property rights in health-related public benefits by 
 
 281 See Taylor, supra note 41, at 7 (“[P]opulations with multiple disadvantaged statuses have 
increased risk of negative health outcomes . . . .”); Brayne, supra note 4, at 387 (describing system 
avoidance as “implicated in the accumulation of disadvantage” of marginalized subpopulations). 
 282 See, e.g., Hacker et al., supra note 43, at 661; Taylor, supra note 41, at 1. 
 283 See KLINE, supra note 44, at 127 (describing one doctor’s opinion of an enhanced 
immigration policing law as racist, which threatens its legitimacy and potentially violates 
professional ethics); Callaghan et al., supra note 23, at 342 (describing politically-driven barriers to 
enrollment in health care programs among Hispanics); Hardy et al., supra note 31, at 1250 (positing 
that Arizona’s SB 1070, which enhanced immigration policing, could exacerbate racial and ethnic 
health disparities); Lee et al., supra note 15, at 1 (noting the impact of heightened immigration 
enforcement on Latinos’ participation in health care programs). 
 284 See KLINE, supra note 44, at 150 (describing racial profiling of Latinx patients in medical 
settings based on assumptions that they are undocumented); Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 332; 
Taylor, supra note 41, at 6-7. 
 285 See Song, supra note 6, at 13 (describing race and class-based stratification of urgent and 
emergency care sites). 
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threatening a deprivation of liberty based on the exercise of those rights. 
The complexity, inconsistency, and vagueness of the laws and policies 
regulating immigration surveillance in health care compromise the legitimacy of 
the state because they make it almost impossible for laypeople to understand their 
rights and the consequences of exercising those rights.286 Studies have long 
documented how confusion about newly enacted laws impacting noncitizens’ 
access to public benefits has chilled noncitizen enrollment in Medicaid. For 
example, chilling effects were observed after the 1996 immigration and welfare 
laws both complicated noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid and the application 
process.287 The lack of clarity in the law helps to create the perception that 
accessing health care or public health insurance is inherently risky for all 
noncitizens.288 
In addition, the laws permitting immigration surveillance in health care create 
legitimacy harms because they encourage or require noncitizens to relinquish their 
privacy rights in their public benefits records. This is especially apparent in the 
context of the 2019 public charge regulations, which used Medicaid, a safety-net 
benefit that supports health and well-being, as the means of “disciplining” 
noncitizens.289 This approach makes the privacy laws appear less legitimate 
because it creates normative confusion around the state’s commitment to ensuring 
privacy in health-related matters.290 It incentivizes behaviors that lead to unjust and 
arbitrary consequences for noncitizens’ health, as described in Part I. The gaps 
between privacy rights formally conferred by law and “whether the rights may be 
utilized and exercised” constitute a legitimacy problem for privacy law.291 
Similarly, immigration surveillance in health care undermines noncitizens’ 
property rights in health-related public benefits because exercise of those rights 
can result in a deprivation of liberty: detention and deportation. It creates 
normative confusion around the state’s commitment to ensuring the health and 
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wellbeing of noncitizens, expressed through laws making them eligible to receive 
health-promoting public benefits. The right to receive assistance from the state to 
access health care becomes a “paper right” — one that the right holder cannot 
sensibly exercise.292 These normative issues could become legal issues if courts 
were to recognize a substantive due process right to information privacy based on 
data-sharing or collection practices that deprive noncitizens of dignity and 
liberty.293 
V. SANCTUARY AS SOLUTION 
Sanctuary policies, whether public or private, “increase the ability of . . . 
noncitizens to engage with government or community institutions without 
detection or apprehension by federal immigration authorities.”294 Noncitizens’ 
freedom to engage in the typical activities of daily life without fear of immigration 
surveillance is a “precedential touchstone” embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
most evidently, in Arizona v. United States.295 Health care sanctuaries can reduce 
immigration-related health care system avoidance by establishing and 
strengthening informational “safe harbors,” so that noncitizens interacting with 
health care institutions in routine and desirable ways are not at risk of 
surveillance.296 Laws and policies can create health care sanctuaries, but non-
governmental organizations can also do so by limiting their cooperation with 
immigration enforcement to what is minimally required under the law,297 and by 
providing noncitizens with physical refuge, legal assistance, or other community 
aid.298 
Health care sanctuaries restore some fairness to immigration policy by 
balancing the indiscriminate pursuit of immigration enforcement with other public 
policy goals and values.299 The previous two Parts illustrate how preferences about 
immigration policies may change when health and legitimacy considerations are 
incorporated. Immigration surveillance in health care undercuts certain health 
policy goals and values and is particularly detrimental to health care institutions 
seeking to best serve their patients. It also compromises the legitimacy of the state 
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in several ways. This Part explains how law and institutional policies can act on 
those changed preferences as “an adaptive response” to the expansion of interior 
immigration enforcement.300 Creating health care sanctuaries is a way to address 
the systemic costs of interior immigration enforcement.301 
Once health care sanctuary policies are established, well-enforced, and well-
known, there is reason to believe that their positive effect on care-seeking by 
noncitizens will endure even if future administrations crack down on immigration 
enforcement. Studies of system avoidance have found that subjects do not avoid 
institutions generally; they specifically avoid recordkeeping institutions.302 If 
health care provider sites and public benefits agencies administering health 
benefits are designated as sanctuaries, they will likely be considered safe spaces 
for noncitizens even if the political climate changes. However, to be effective, it is 
critical that information about health care sanctuaries is communicated clearly and 
deliberately to immigrant communities by trusted messengers.303 
A. Legal Reforms 
While the ultimate solution to health care system avoidance for undocumented 
noncitizens may be immigration reform that gives them a path to citizenship,304 
such reform may not come any time soon, nor would it address the larger issue of 
immigration surveillance in health care that deters lawfully present noncitizens 
from enrolling in public health insurance. In the meantime, there are legal reforms 
that can address this problem immediately. Health care sanctuary laws can address 
sources of health care system avoidance for both populations. 
There is expressive value in legislation at any level that limits information-
sharing from health care providers and public benefits agencies to immigration 
authorities.305 Such laws influence cultural beliefs about where immigration 
enforcement activities should occur, which could ultimately influence courts’ 
interpretations of substantive due process rights to information privacy.306 
Similarly, positive law at any level limiting immigration enforcement activities at 
health care provider sites based on considerations of individual autonomy and 
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dignity could influence courts’ interpretations of what is considered a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in health care settings.307 This Section proposes some ways 
in which legislative bodies and executive branch agencies might consider creating 
health care sanctuaries. 
The current administration has announced plans for both immigration and 
health reform. A national strategy on immigrant health could guide Congress, 
DHS, and HHS on how to balance immigration and health policy goals; national 
strategies are particularly well suited for addressing complex issues.308 A national 
strategy arising from an executive order or federal legislation could be a catalyst 
for more interagency coordination on issues relating to immigrant health and health 
care access. It could be based on the Health in All Policies (HiAP) approach, which 
aims to “achiev[e] better public health outcomes through increased intersectoral 
collaboration.”309 An immigrant health task force could coordinate HiAP efforts 
involving multiple agencies.310 
Alternatively, the President and Congress may consider creating a new agency 
or consolidating existing agencies to prioritize the elimination of health care access 
barriers in vulnerable communities, including in immigrant communities.311 In a 
different context, Emily Broad Leib and Margot Pollans discuss the value of 
“drawing together components of several preexisting agencies” to coordinate 
action on important national issues.312 This option avoids the need to coordinate 
across agencies, which can become complicated.313 A single agency focused on 
addressing inequitable access to health care could be particularly adept at 
analyzing how health care sanctuary policies might also eliminate race, ethnicity, 
and class-related barriers for U.S. citizens and lawfully present noncitizens.314 
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Part of a national strategy on immigrant health could include enacting a 
federal Protecting Sensitive Locations Act, which would build on and improve 
DHS’s sensitive locations policies. Political barriers in the past have prevented 
such an Act from being passed.315 The Act addresses many of the weaknesses of 
the sensitive locations policies: It applies uniform standards to all individuals 
performing immigration enforcement functions; specifies a protected zone of 
1,000 feet around a sensitive location; requires officers to discontinue enforcement 
actions that began at other locations but that move near sensitive locations; and 
considers “any medical treatment or health care facility” to be a sensitive 
location.316 Enforcement actions that may occur at sensitive locations must have 
prior approval and be justified based on exigent circumstances; notably, exigent 
circumstances is defined with precision.317 Finally, the Act provides some 
accountability measures. Most importantly, information obtained from 
enforcement actions that violate the law cannot be used against a noncitizen in 
removal proceedings, and the noncitizen may move to terminate the 
proceedings.318 The Act also requires DHS to conduct annual training for officers 
about the sensitive locations law and to report to Congress about enforcement 
actions conducted at sensitive locations.319 Passing the Protecting Sensitive 
Locations Act would be a positive step toward limiting immigration surveillance 
in health care. However, the final version of the Act should seek to limit DHS 
officers from conducting even the limited investigatory activities that they are 
permitted to conduct at sensitive locations, since such activities alone can deter 
noncitizens from accessing services. 
DHS can immediately address concerns about surveillance at health care 
provider sites because it has significant discretion to set priorities and allocate 
resources toward this objective. Such action would fit squarely within the agency’s 
mission of protecting life and safety, which is its highest priority, surpassing 
ordinary immigration enforcement practices.320 One potential action would be to 
issue a new sensitive locations policy memo strengthening enforcement of the 
policies, clarifying points of confusion, and expanding their scope. This could be 
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done relatively quickly. 
States could also play an important role as “privacy norm entrepreneurs” for 
noncitizens’ health-related information, a role they have played in other 
contexts.321 State public benefits agencies that have not modified their applications 
for public health insurance to ensure that only applicants are required to provide 
their citizenship and immigration status and SSN should do so. These agencies 
should also provide clear information on the applications themselves about how 
they will use applicants’ personal information and the confidential protections that 
apply. For example, agencies could state explicitly that they will only use SSNs to 
verify income and will not share them with immigration authorities. This message 
should be reinforced throughout the eligibility determination process. States 
should also create applications for Medicaid and CHIP separate from applications 
for other public benefits because Medicaid and CHIP have stronger confidentiality 
protections and do not require families or households to apply for benefits as a 
unit. These relatively simple state-level reforms could go a long way toward 
addressing noncitizens’ fears of applying for public health insurance. 
Community outreach should also be an essential part of the state’s strategy to 
regain the trust of immigrant communities that have felt betrayed by the punitive 
immigration policies of the Trump Administration. However, it will be an uphill 
climb. Efforts to build trust should begin at the institutions closest to the ground, 
such as the public benefits agencies where noncitizens apply for public health 
insurance.322 A challenge for public benefits agencies is to increase trust between 
applicants and agency caseworkers, among whom turnover is high.323 One strategy 
may be to co-locate agency caseworkers at trusted institutions, such as health care 
provider sites in immigrant communities.324 Another strategy is to promote a 
welcoming culture at public benefits agencies and in official materials using 
signage, videos, and community presentations that emphasize noncitizens’ rights 
to access publicly funded health care and transparency about any possible 
immigration-related consequences. 
B. Institutional Reforms 
In the absence of legal immigration reform that comprehensively addresses 
immigration surveillance in health care, health care institutions should consider 
what policies they can implement independently to become health care 
sanctuaries.325 Health care providers have the unique role of safeguarding the 
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health and wellbeing of their patients, and this role justifies limiting cooperation 
with immigration enforcement to the minimum degree necessary.326 Providers are 
also respected spokespeople who can potentially shape public discourse in support 
of immigration policies that promote individual and public health.327 Although 
some health care providers and professional organizations have spoken out and 
acted against immigration enforcement-related interference with their professional 
duties,328 it is clear that there is much more work that can and should be done.329 
Health care providers are becoming increasingly aware of the important role 
they can play in countering immigration-related health care system avoidance,330 
and some have taken steps to transform their institutions to this end.331 For 
example, a recent commentary described the development and accomplishments 
of the Immigrant Task Force at Boston Medical Center, which was created in 2017 
to respond to noncitizen patients’ increasing fears of accessing health care.332 Dr. 
Altaf Saadi has developed a website333 and toolkit334 based on her study of health 
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care institutions that have implemented policies to address immigration-related 
fears of their patients. And prominent national organizations such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the National Immigration Law Center, and Physicians for 
Human Rights have published resources that encourage health care providers to 
adopt policies and practices that protect noncitizens’ ability to access health 
care.335 For many health care providers, such efforts align with a more general 
mission of providing equitable access to health care, particularly for vulnerable 
populations.336 The remainder of this Section describes reforms for aspiring health 
care sanctuaries that have been suggested by advocacy groups and described in the 
scholarly literature. 
Health care institutions can develop internal protocols for protecting 
noncitizen patients from interrogation, search, and arrest if immigration authorities 
come onsite.337 Some institutions have developed “rapid response teams” of 
designated staff who are available on-call to respond to such appearances.338 
Members of the team may be responsible for communicating the institution’s 
policies, ensuring that immigration authorities are complying with the laws and 
policies that discourage immigration surveillance activities at health care sites, and 
otherwise resolving any requests or actions promptly and without causing alarm to 
any patients present. In large health systems, members of rapid response teams 
may include health care providers, attorneys from the office of general counsel, 
social workers, privacy officers, representatives from the medical records 
department, members of the clinical ethics consultation service, and high-level 
administrators focused on patient experience. Academic medical centers may also 
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draw on faculty members affiliated with the institution, such as law professors with 
relevant expertise and directors of law school clinics. Smaller institutions could 
pool their resources and coordinate community-based rapid response teams, 
consisting of pro bono and public interest attorneys, members of faith-based and 
other community groups, local government officials,339 activists, retired 
physicians, students, and others willing to donate their services to the cause. 
Lawyers on rapid response teams should be prepared to represent patients in the 
event of arrests; advise patients and their family members about their rights in the 
ensuing legal process; and to address any ancillary legal issues that may arise. The 
medical-legal partnership model, which typically involves collaboration between 
health care provider staff and lawyers onsite, may be well-suited for this 
purpose.340 Health care providers and social workers would advise patients who 
are arrested about any treatment needs, particularly if the patient is likely to be 
detained for a prolonged period. The medical records staff would be responsible 
for obtaining an arrested patient’s consent to transmit records relating to any 
treatment needs to their family members and/or to the medical staff at the detention 
facility where the patient will be housed, to ensure continuity of care. 
Health care providers can also designate certain spaces, such as private exam 
rooms, as “closed to the public” in order to prevent officers from conducting 
warrantless visual or oral surveillance of patients and patient records in supposedly 
“public” areas.341 Under the plain view doctrine, an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, immigration officers can inspect items that are 
visible in plain view in locations where they are lawfully present.342 Therefore, 
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providers should ensure that patient charts are not visible from areas that are 
arguably open to the public, like waiting rooms, and that conversations about 
immigration status do not occur there.343 
Health care providers can establish liberal policies about documents that 
satisfy identification requirements for patient registration purposes.344 Although 
driver’s licenses are the most frequently used document to establish patients’ 
identities, many states do not permit undocumented noncitizens to acquire them.345 
Therefore, providers should clarify that a variety of documents may be used to 
establish identity, such as foreign passports or national identification cards, school 
or employee identification cards, or certain medical records, such as hospital birth 
records or others containing photographs and biographical information. 
Health care institutions should ensure that their staff is well-trained on internal 
policies designed to limit immigration surveillance in health care.346 Such trainings 
build understanding of the importance to the organization’s mission of protecting 
health care access for all patients, regardless of citizenship or immigration status 
and regardless of any person’s opinion about immigration policy. Additional 
trainings could seek to educate staff on the laws relating to immigration 
consequences of enrolling in public health insurance347 and the confidentiality of 
patient information,348 how to speak openly with patients about immigration-
related barriers to health care, and how to assure patients that their care is not 
compromised because of their immigration status.349 
Finally, community outreach to immigrant communities about health care 
sanctuary policies is critical to allaying fears of immigration surveillance in health 
care.350 Health care institutions are uniquely situated to provide trusted information 
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to noncitizens about the limited circumstances in which accessing health care or 
coverage can have negative immigration consequences, and to direct patients to 
community resources to help support their decision-making.351 Community 
outreach should be conducted by community health workers, patient navigators, 
and other trusted messengers.352 Community outreach may include education for 
patients and their families about their rights in immigration enforcement actions 
and the health care institution’s policies relating to noncooperation with ICE.353 
Such outreach should be linguistically appropriate and could be paired with 
information about noncitizen eligibility for public health insurance and 
confidentiality protections for applicants.354 
Although laws restricting or deterring noncitizens from accessing health care 
or coverage may cause some noncitizens to lose trust in their health care 
providers,355 providers who are knowledgeable about these issues and who can 
provide resources to noncitizen patients fare better.356 For example, health care 
providers should consider forming medical-legal partnerships or having legal 
advocates on staff to advise patients about these issues, both for the benefit of 
patient families and to improve health outcomes.357 Alliances between health care 
providers and legal advocates could also lead to natural opportunities to jointly 
advocate for immigrant patients’ interests.358 
CONCLUSION 
Noncitizens living in the United States are increasingly fearful of being 
surveilled by immigration authorities while going about the typical activities of 
daily life, including going to the doctor or applying for health insurance. Although 
immigration surveillance in health care may be justified in certain circumstances, 
it is a poor tradeoff in the general case. This is because the collateral consequences 
for public health and the health care system are severe. Policymakers should take 
these health-related consequences into account when weighing the utility of 
indiscriminate immigration enforcement, especially during a pandemic. Health 
 
 351 Lee et al., supra note 15, at 6. 
 352 Hacker et al., supra note 2, at 179. 
 353 See, e.g., Saadi et al., supra note 332, at 6 (describing Know Your Rights programs provided 
to patients at health care facilities). 
 354 Rhodes et al., supra note 23, at 336; Saadi et al., supra note 331, at 6. 
 355 See, e.g., PARK, supra note 1, at 80 (describing the impact of PRWORA and IIRIRA in 
1996). 
 356 Id. 
 357 See id. at 130, 148; Lee et al., supra note 15, at 5; Saadi et al., supra note 332, at 6; Van 
Natta, supra note 21, at 5. Medical-legal partnerships may be theorized as non-governmental versions 
of HiAP, as they are cross-sectoral efforts to improve health. See Pepin et al., supra note 245, at 61. 
 358 See PARK, supra note 1, at 149; Lee et al., supra note 15, at 6 (describing the unique position 
of health care providers to support the rights of immigrant families). 
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care sanctuaries are a pragmatic, principled, and legitimacy-enhancing solution to 
the problems associated with immigration-related health care system avoidance. 
This approach suggests possibilities for balancing health-related policy goals with 
immigration policy goals in contexts beyond immigration surveillance in health 
care. 
 
